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I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorist attacks precipitate a collective emotional outrage. Calls by the
injured body politic for justice and increased security pressure its leaders to undertake a broad array of international and domestic responses. Part of a government’s response to terrorism may be operational: an invasion or attack on
another country or sub-national entity. This was the case in the aftermath of the
669
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September 11 attacks as military operations were directed against Iraq, as a
country, and Al-Qaeda, as a sub-state entity.
Another aspect of a response to a terror attack may be legal. A significant component of the American response to September 11 was legally-based
changes to the structure of the government and authority under which it operates. A new cabinet department—the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”)—was created along with a historic reshuffling of administrative agencies. 1 Moreover, a host of legal changes to domestic laws altering the range of
permissible investigatory and intelligence-collecting tools was enacted as the
PATRIOT Act. 2
Post-September 11 sociopolitical dynamics are far from unique. Other
events in American history have precipitated a legislative response to a terrorist
threat. For instance, the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City led to a similar call to action and subsequent congressional enactment.3 The American polity, moreover, does not stand alone in
responding to terrorist threats or attacks with legislation. Political violence in
South Africa, for instance, prompted the then-apartheid government to pass a
multitude of increasingly more restrictive measures designed to curtail the activities of the African National Congress. 4 The United Kingdom also passed nu-

*
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**
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1
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
2
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
3
See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
301, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
4
See, e.g., Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 (S. Afr.); Affected Organisations Act 31 of 1974
(S. Afr.); Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 (S. Afr.); General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1966 (S. Afr.);
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 96 of 1965 (S. Afr.); General Law Amendment Act 37 of
1963 (S. Afr.); General Law Amendment Act 76 of 1962 (S. Afr.); Unlawful Organisations Act 34
of 1960 (S. Afr.); Criminal Law Amendment Act 8 of 1953 (S. Afr.); Public Safety Act 3 of 1953
(S. Afr.); Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 (S. Afr.).
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merous laws designed to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland and, later, AlQaeda. 5
Many anti-terrorism measures are enacted with broad public support.
There is often a general willingness on the part of the public to accept greater
civil liberties deprivations in the face of a specific threat, or otherwise in times
of general crisis, than would otherwise be the case.6 Sweeping anti-terrorism
legislation is frequently crafted in reaction to the presence, or perceived presence, of immense, imminent danger. The medium- and long-term consequences
of the legislation may not fully be comprehended when political leaders and
policymakers take swift action in the face of strong public pressure because of a
recent terrorist attack or continuing threat of violence. An unintended, and oft
unforeseen, consequence of anti-terrorism legislation is that it may alter substantive and procedural law. Various constitutional protections traditionally afforded
to criminal defendants, and indeed the general public, may be eroded in the
name of national security. Procedural law may also be affected by anti-terrorism
legislation leading to substantive consequences that may not have been anticipated by the law’s drafters, and staying on the books long after the immediate
threat has passed. This socio-legal phenomenon is “mission creep”—the application of anti-terrorism legislation, its substantive law and procedures, to nonterrorist related offenses and other activities not contemplated in its original
enactment. 7
5

See, e.g., Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act, 2010, c. 2 (Eng.); The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, S.I. 2009/1747 (Eng.); The Counter-Terrorism Act,
2008, c. 28 (Eng.); The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, S.I. 2006/2657 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.); Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act, 1984, c. 8 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976,
c. 8 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56 (Eng.).
6
See Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 191
(2003) (stating that there is a sense that a curtailment of liberty may be appropriate and that it may
be unreasonable to insist on the same restrictions of government power that were present prior to
an attack); Michael Welch, Trampling Human Rights in the War on Terror: Implications to the
Sociology of Denial, 12 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003) (discussing the sociology of “moral
panic” and the war on terror).
7
Risa Berkower, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use of Administrative Subpoenas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251, 2286 (2005) (noting mission creep
could erode Fourth Amendment protections); James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flin, Commercial
Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1492 (2004) (noting that “mission
creep” encompasses instances whereby “access to commercial sources of information for counterterrorism purposes, an agency or other agencies will then seek to use the information for purposes
extending beyond counterterrorism, purposes that on their own would not have supported access
to the information”); Matthew R. Hall, Constitutional Regulation of National Security Investigation: Minimizing the Use of Unrelated Evidence, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 61 (2006) (noting that
the prospect of mission creep imposes a long term institutional danger); Richard Henry Seamon &
William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law
Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 458–60 (2005).
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One aspect of anti-terrorism laws that has received considerable attention has been the authority to, and standard by which, enemy combatants can be
detained and tried. 8 Indeed, there are significant implications on separation of
powers in the American government; the status and applicability of international
law in the American legal framework; and what limits, if any, exist on the President in his or her capacity as Commander-in-Chief. Yet recent anti-terrorism
legislation in both the United States and United Kingdom go well beyond traditional limits of constitutional authority. Domestic and foreign legislative responses to September 11 have made significant changes to the law governing
financial crimes. New rules on civil forfeiture, asset freezing, financial privacy,
and ordinary criminal jurisprudence have taken effect. These new rules are far
from benign; financial and legal institutions, criminal defendants, and ordinary
citizens are affected by their scope. Presently, financial and white-collar crimes
are the areas of criminal law most at risk for mission creep from anti-terrorism
legislation.
This Article takes a comparative approach to analyzing mission creep in
anti-terrorism legislation and financial crimes, including its foundations, its
forms, and its effects. In order to gain a complete perspective of mission creep,
its judicial basis must be explored. This Article will examine how judicial procedures and substantive constitutional law may be altered in light of national
security concerns, and how blanket deference to the executive in times of crisis
may lead to medium- and long-term unintended consequences particularly as
8

A multitude of articles have explored the jurisprudence and implications of military tribunals and presidential authority. See, e.g., Fionnuala D. Ni Aolain, Hamdan and Common Article 3:
Did the Supreme Court Get it Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523 (2007); Mark A. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and
International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (2007); David Fontana, A Case for the
Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: Schneiderman v. United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35
(2002); Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for Detaining Terrorists, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 511 (2007); Douglas A. Hass, Crafting Military Commissions PostHamdan: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 82 IND. L.J. 1101 (2007); Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J.
1259 (2002); Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Ghosts of Horace Gray: Customary International Law as
Expectation in Human Rights Litigation, 97 KY. L.J. 615 (2009); Winston P. Nagan & Craig
Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
375 (2004); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Enemy Combatant Cases in Historical Contest: The Inevitablity of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005 (2007); Mark Rahdert,
Double-Checking Executive Emergency Power: Lessons from Hamdi and Hamdan, 80 TEMPLE L.
REV. 451 (2007); Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of
Armed Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 601 (2007); Ingrid B. Wuerth, The President’s Power to
Detain ‘Enemy Combatants’: Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L.
REV. 1567 (2004). Legal education has also taken up the cause with symposia and class offerings
dedicated to national security law and public policy. See, e.g., Maxwell O. Chibundu, For God,
for Country, for Universalism, Sovereignty as Solidarity in Our Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV.
883 (2004); Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in an Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867 (2004); Winston
P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, Patriotism, Nationalism, and the War on Terror: A Mild Plea in
Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REV. 933 (2004); Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sovereignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017 (2004).
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they relate to civil liberties. Part II presents historical instances of legislative
responses to terrorism in both America and Britain. Specifically, the British
“criminalization” policy, a response to political violence in Northern Ireland,
will be examined. Northern Ireland presents an interesting case study of how
anti-terrorism legislation can encroach upon the civil liberties of individuals
accused of non-terrorism-related offenses. The British experience also demonstrates how anti-terrorism legislation can perpetuate itself even where there is a
relative decrease in violence levels or when the dynamics of the conflict have
changed.
The foundations of American national security law are also explored in
Part II. American national security institutions have developed in contrast to
their British counterparts. Rather than a legislative measure being enacted to
respond to a specific danger, American jurisprudence has traditionally been on
the forefront in responding to various threats of varying magnitudes. Special
needs exceptions have been carved from the Fourth Amendment for reasons
such as officer protection and school safety. Various judicial tests have also
been formulated throughout American Courts of Appeal for prosecuting criminal defendants based on a theory of willful blindness or deliberate ignorance of
criminal activity. In certain circumstances, criminal convictions have been sustained even where the underlying conduct has not fully satisfied the mens rea
requirement of the specific offense charged. Of course, there are instances
where Congress has responded to specific threats such as the Oklahoma City
bombing. Indeed, in responding to an act of domestic terrorism, the rules governing the First Amendment and habeas corpus were significantly affected.
All of these areas of substantive law have informed how anti-terrorism legislation operates in practice and can germinate into areas of substantive law.
The anti-terrorism measures that have had the greatest impact on the institutional integrity of financial and legal systems, however, are the American
and British legal response to the September 11 attacks. Part III begins by outlining traditional notions of bank secrecy and financial privacy. The British response to September 11, with a particular focus on financial crimes, is presented
in light of previous efforts to combat terrorist financing in Northern Ireland.
Title III of the PATRIOT Act relating to financial crimes is also presented.
Provisions of the Act relating to international financial crimes and money laundering will be analyzed in light of traditional protections of financial privacy
and underlying jurisprudence. Sections of the Act regarding information sharing
between law enforcement agencies and the elimination of the distinction between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations will also be expounded
upon. The current dynamics of mission creep resulting from both legislative
initiatives and judicial responses is also presented. Finally, Part IV provides a
brief conclusion, asserting that judicial institutions should remain vigilant in
protecting constitutional rights when reviewing executive action.
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II. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF MISSION CREEP
Mission creep can be a significant threat for the continued protection of
civil liberties during a time of crisis, or the perception thereof. 9 In order to fully
analyze patterns in, and the effects of, this socio-legal phenomenon, antiterrorism legislation and its related jurisprudence will be examined in both the
United States and Britain. Primarily, two responses to crises characterize the
dangers inherent in anti-terrorist legislation with regard to inadvertent, often
negative effects on other areas of substantive and procedural law. The first instance is the “criminalization” strategy used by the British government to combat Northern Ireland political violence. The second was the American legal response to the Oklahoma City bombing. Both examples illustrate how antiterrorist legislation, operating within a greater legal framework, can have consequences beyond what was originally intended by the legislation.
A.

Criminalization and Terrorism: The Case of Northern Ireland

Conflict in Ireland spans its entire history, with cyclical flashpoints of
violence and relative tranquility. The Irish Free State was established after the
Anglo-Irish War of 1919–1921, and an independent republic was declared in
1949. 10 Yet independence came at the price of the partition of the six northern
counties of the island where Protestants/Unionists comprised a majority of the
population. 11 Electoral boundaries were established so as to give Unionists a
disproportional advantage in the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont. 12 Security measures were enforced by the sectarian paramilitary police: the BSpecials and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. 13
An ensuing escalation in the levels of political violence by nationalist
paramilitaries followed, the most notable of which was the Provisional Irish
Republican Army (“IRA”). 14 Tactics were a mixture of terrorism in the classical
sense—targeting non-combatants with the purpose of communicating a political
message 15—and political violence directed against targets associated with the
9

See supra note 8.
CONNOR A. GEARTY, TERRORISM 392–93 (1991).
11
Id. at 377.
12
Id. at 394; DAVID MCKITTRICK & DAVID MCVEA, MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES: THE
STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 22 (2002).
13
GEARTY, supra note 10, at 115–16. For a general overview of the Northern Ireland conflict
see generally MCKITTRICK & MCVEA, supra note 12, at 11.
14
Other nationalist paramilitary groups operating in Northern Ireland were the Real Irish
Republican Army (“Real IRA”), the Irish National Liberation Army (“INLA”), Saor Éire, Fianna
na hÉireann, and Cumann na mBan. Corresponding unionist paramilitary groups also emerged in
the region and included the Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”), Ulster Freedom Force (“UFF”),
Loyalist Volunteer Force (“LVF”), and Red Hand Command (“RHC”).
15
There is no consensus on what “terrorism” as a method of violence encompasses. For
present purposes it is defined as intentional or reckless violence against the person or property of
10
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British control of Northern Ireland. 16 The escalation of violence, beginning in
1971, resulted in a foreseeable government response: the enactment of emergency (i.e. temporary) anti-terrorism legislation. 17 Although the political violence
peaked in 1972, the legal responses to political violence were renewed, expanded, and applied to other areas of law despite a relative decrease in the level
of violence.
1.

The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974

The primary British legal response to politically-motivated violence in
Northern Ireland was the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act,
1974. 18 The Act was a direct political and legislative reaction to two pub bombings in Birmingham, England, and an increase in the level of violent attacks: 86
explosions occurred in 1973. 19 Indeed, political pressure mounted on the government in Westminster to deal with what was described as “the gravest threat
[to Britain] since the end of the Second World War.”20 In introducing the Act in
the House of Commons, then-Home Secretary Roy Jenkins described the legislation as “draconian” and “unprecedented in peacetime.” 21 He also went on to
defend it as an enfacement that was fully justified to meet the “clear and present
danger.” 22 The House of Commons passed the Act less than forty-two hours
after its introduction, without amendment.
The three key provisions of the Temporary Provisions Act were proscription, exclusion, and detention. Proscription established three new criminal
offenses. First, membership in the IRA alone, absent any substantive conduct,
non-combatants to communicate a political message. See Haig Khatchadourian, Terrorism and
Morality, 5 J. APPLIED PHIL. 131 (1988); Kai Nielsen, On the Moral Justifiability of Terrorism
(State and Otherwise), 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 427, 428–30 (2003) (noting multiple definitions of
terrorism); Igor Primoratz, State Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND JUSTICE: MORAL ARGUMENT IN A
THREATENED WORLD 31, 37 (Tony Coady & Michael O’Keefe eds., 2002); Jenny Teichman, How
to Define Terrorism, 64 PHIL. 505, 507 (1989).
16
For instance, the bombing of the British Conservative Party Conference in Brighton in 1984
was an assassination attempt on the Prime Minister herself rather than intended to communicate a
political message. Conversely, the bombings of “Bloody Friday” were intended to communicate a
political message without concern for the agency the twenty targets played in the chain of British
rule of the territory. See GEARTY, supra note 10, at 344; ADRIAN GUELKE, THE AGE OF TERRORISM
AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 123–24 (1998).
17
The term “anti-terrorism legislation” denotes legal responses to politically-motivated violence falling within and outside classical definitions of terrorism. See supra note 15 (noting the
classical definition of “terrorism”).
18
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56 (Eng.).
19
K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN
BRITAIN 213–14 (1990).
20
882 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) 743 (U.K.).
21
882 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) 35 (U.K.).
22
Id.
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was sufficient to secure a conviction punishable by a term of incarceration of no
more than five years. 23 Soliciting or collecting funds for any proscribed organization was also punishable under the same provision.24 Second, it was deemed a
crime to “assist[ ] in the arrangement or management” of a meeting of three or
more people “knowing that the meeting is to support, or to further the activities
of, a proscribed organization.” 25 Third, anyone who publicly “wears any item of
dress, 26 or [ ]wears, carries or displays any article in such a way as to arouse
reasonable apprehension that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organization” could face up to three months in prison and a fine of £200. 27
The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, also granted the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland authority to exclude persons from the U.K. on the
suspicion of terrorist activities.28 If “satisfied” that “any person . . . is concerned
in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism” the Secretary
may prohibit the individual from entering or residing in the U.K. 29 Additionally,
if any person is “attempting or may attempt” to enter the United Kingdom with
the intent to engage, or assist in an act of terrorism, the Secretary is authorized
to prohibit the individual from entering Britain. 30 Although there is an obligation to consider nonfrivolous representations made by the subject of an exclusion order, the Secretary is only obligated to consult another appointed official. 31 Sole discretion to enter and enforce an exclusion order was vested with
the Secretary. 32
The most controversial provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act,
1974, however, were those pertaining to arrest and detention. An officer had the
power to arrest anyone they “reasonably suspect[ed]” to be engaged or who
23

Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 1(1)(a).
§ 1(1)(b). The prohibition on IRA financing was drawn broadly. Any person who “solicits
or invites financial or other support for a proscribed organisation, or knowingly makes or receives
any contribution in money or otherwise to the resources of a proscribed organization” was punishable for a term of ten years imprisonment. Id.
25
§ 1(1)(c).
26
§ 2(1)(a).
27
§ 2(1)(b). For the rationale of the House of Commons regarding the prohibition on wearing
politically communicative clothing see 882 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) 636 (U.K.) (arguing
that the public should not be forced to be affronted by “public demonstrations” in support of the
IRA); 38 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1983) 633 (U.K.) (stating that IRA members should not be
afforded the ability to “flaunt themselves in public”).
28
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 3(1).
29
§ 3(3)(a).
30
§ 3(3)(a). Exclusion orders, however, do not extend to persons residing in the U.K. for the
previous twenty years or were born in the U.K. and resided there throughout their life. § 3(4)(a)–
(b). The burden of proof of demonstrating one has been a constant resident is on the suspect. §
3(5).
31
§ 4(4).
32
§§ 3(1)–(3), 5.
24
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might partake in an act of terrorism or the support thereof.33 The suspect could
be detained for forty-eight hours with a possible five-day extension upon approval of the Secretary of State. 34 During this time the police may restrict outside communication to family and legal counsel. 35 Moreover, the traditional
common-law procedure of bringing an arrested person before a court was eliminated in instances of suspected terrorists. 36
2.

The Permanence of the Temporary

The 1974 Act, widely considered at the time to be a broad and sweeping
incursion into traditional guarantees of civil liberties, was due to expire within
six months of its enactment. 37 Yet the 1974 Act was given two, half-year extensions in 1975 and 1976 respectively, despite a dramatic drop in the death rate in
Northern Ireland. Yearly deaths related to the Northern Irish conflict peaked in
1972 with 467. 38 The rate dropped by over half as there were 247 conflict deaths
occurring in 1975. 39
A new Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act was
enacted in 1976, with a renewal period of one year. 40 The 1976 Act was renewed annually until it was amended and reenacted in 1984.41 The 1984 Act
was given a maximum life of five years prior to new legislation being required.
Also significant was that the 1984 Act incorporated “international terrorism”
into its provisions. After the five-year period, the Government in Westminster
adopted the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, which
was subject to indefinite annual renewals. 42 Violence levels during this time,
however, had largely stabilized. Between 50 and 115 conflict-related deaths
occurred annually between 1978 and 1994.43 Much of the fluctuations in vi33

§ 7(1).
§ 7(2).
35
EWING & GEARTY, supra note 19, at 222.
36
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 7(3). The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974,
rendered inapplicable multiple due process safeguards relating to arrestees. Specifically, provisions contained in the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, c. 55, § 38 (Eng.); the Children and Young
Persons Act, 1969, c. 54, § 29 (Eng.); the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954, c. 48, §
20(3) (Scot.); the Magistrates’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland), 1964, c. 21, § 132 (N. Ir.); the
Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland), 1968, c. 34, § 50(3) (N. Ir.) relating to due
process and procedures of arrest were abrogated. See infra notes 65–77 and accompanying text
(discussing changes in trial procedures and substantive law).
37
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 12(1).
38
GUELKE, supra note 16, at 112.
39
Id.
40
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976, c. 8 (Eng.); see EWING &
GEARTY, supra note 19, at 214.
41
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, c. 8 (Eng.).
42
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4 (Eng.).
43
GUELKE, supra note 16, at 112.
34
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olence can be attributed to the conflict’s political dynamics: various declared
ceasefires, renewed violent campaigns, and negotiations. The constant renewal
of British anti-terrorist legislation notwithstanding the relative decline in the
levels of violence in Northern Ireland show the self-reinforcing nature of legal
responses to terrorism: if there are no attacks, the legislation is working; if there
is an attack, it is needed. Thus, a fundamental irony emerges: as the level of
political violence drops, the legal responses designed to counter them strengthens. 44
The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989 supplemented the original 1974
Act with additional offenses and expanded police powers, including a provision
providing for the forfeiture of funds and property relating to terrorism. 45 Detention without legal recourse was continued, as were exclusion orders without
judicial review.46 The Prevention of Terrorism Acts served as the legal basis for
future anti-terrorism legislation targeting violence associated with Al-Qaeda and
related organizations. 47
3.

Distortions in the Criminal Law

British anti-terrorism legislation, geographically applicable to only
Northern Ireland at first, and then to the U.K. as a whole, was gradually expanded in both scope and applicability. 48 Corollary to the substantive offenses
outlined in the Prevention of Terrorism Acts were changes in criminal procedure. Anti-terrorism provisions morphed into the ordinary criminal law, having
substantial implications for defendants. That is, not only did British antiterrorism legislation expand and perpetuate itself, it affected other areas of substantive and procedural law. The most blatant example of this was the use of juryless “Diplock” trials for “scheduled” offenses.49
44

EWING & GEARTY, supra note 19, at 215.
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, c. 4, § 13.
46
§§ 14–15.
47
See, e.g., Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act, 2010, c. 2 (Eng.); The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2009, No. 1747 (Eng.); The Counter-Terrorism Act,
2008, c. 28 (Eng.); The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2006, No. 2657 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.). See also Mark
Elliott, United Kingdom: Detention Without Trial and the War on Terror, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 553
(2006) (discussing the expansion of detention periods in British anti-terrorism legislation).
48
The Prevention of Terrorism Acts had general applicability throughout the United Kingdom,
whereas the Emergency Provisions Acts were applicable solely to Northern Ireland. Fionnuala Ní
Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (1996).
49
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53 (Eng.); Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, § 1(1)(3); John D. Jackson, Katie Quinn, & Tom O’Malley,
The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland: In the Shadow of a Troubled Past, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 219 (1999). The Emergency Provisions Act, like the Prevention of Terrorism Acts, was subsequently revised and extended in 1987, 1991, and 1996. For a general back45
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The rationale of the juryless courts was embodied in the 1972 Diplock
Report, which stated that the unique nature of paramilitary violence in Northern
Ireland necessitated abrogating the right to a jury trial. 50 Specifically, the presence of paramilitary groups and the threat of intimidation raised the question of
the ability of jurors to render verdicts without considering possible repercussions. 51 There was also a perceived risk that sectarian loyalties in the jury pool
might result in unjust acquittals or convictions.52
The Diplock Courts have, however, been widely used to prosecute offenses unrelated to terrorism. 53 An average of 630 defendants per year were
brought before Diplock Courts between 1980 and 1986. 54 Yet, 40 percent of
defendants brought before these special juryless courts were implicated in offenses that had no political mens rea or content. 55 Some solicitors have also
admitted to using emergency provisions for offenses outside the scope of antiterrorism legislation.56 Additionally, juryless trials were statutorily required for
non-scheduled offenses in instances where the defendant was also charged with
a scheduled offense. 57 Judges not satisfied that the defendant was guilty of a
scheduled offense had discretionary authority to render a conviction if they were
“satisfied that [the defendant was] guilty of some other offense . . . which a jury
could have found him guilty.” 58
Evidentiary standards were also altered for both jury and non-jury trials
relating to apolitical and non-paramilitary offenses. In an attempt to clamp down
on terrorist activities, judges’ common law rules were replaced by lower statutory standards regarding the admissibility of evidence.59 For example, evidentiary
ground of juryless trials in Northern Ireland see generally JOHN D. JACKSON & SEAN DORAN,
JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1995).
50
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185 [hereinafter Diplock Commission].
51
Id. ¶ 36.
52
Id.
53
EWING & GEARTY, supra note 19, at 228.
54
Id. at 229. The applications to prosecute a crime as a scheduled offense varied throughout
the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1978, for example, 1515 applications were made to prosecute
such offenses. Id.
55
Aolain, supra note 48, at 1378; GERARD HOGAN & CLIVE WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE
AND THE LAW IN IRELAND 122 (1989).
56
Aolain, supra note 48, at 1378.
57
Emergency Provisions Act, 1978, c. 5, § 7(3) (Eng.).
58
§ 7(4)(a)–(b) (emphasis added). It is also to be noted that some scheduled offenses could be
tried summarily.
59
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, §§ 11, 12 (Eng.); Peter Hall, The
Prevention of Terrorism Acts, in JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 160–64 (Anthony Jennings ed., 1988). It is also to be noted that the standard
for excluding evidence obtained through torture or other degrading treatment was lowered from
that which would normally govern. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76(2)
(Eng.) (provisions governing admissibility of confessions).
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standards were changed to permit an inference to be drawn from a defendant’s
silence at trial. If a suspect failed to mention a fact at arrest, and later attempted
to rely on it during trial, an inference may be drawn based on the reasonableness
of the omission. 60 A defendant’s failure to explain any object, substance, or
mark, or why he or she was in a particular location can also be used at trial to
infer guilt, as can a failure to give evidence on one’s own behalf at trial.61
Another example of diminished evidentiary and procedural standards
used in the United Kingdom in the furtherance of national security was the socalled “supergrass” trials.62 Derived from “informer” in Cockney vernacular, the
supergrass trials permitted the secret, uncorroborated testimony of only one witness as sufficient to secure a criminal conviction.63 Conviction rates steadily
rose to around 88 percent in 1983, with 55 percent of trials in Northern Ireland
resting on uncorroborated, supergrass evidence. 64 Typically, an informer would
be given immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony regarding the
paramilitary activities of their associates. This testimony alone was sufficient for
a conviction, yet it was often motivated by personal “vindictiveness” on the part
of witnesses and informers, thereby increasing the risk of miscarriages of justice. 65
The case of Joseph Charles Bennett is illustrative of how anti-terrorist
legislation can corrupt substantive criminal and evidentiary law. Mr. Bennett
was a criminal from an early age, first committing petit larceny at age eleven. 66
He became involved in loyalist paramilitary activities and served six years in
HMP Maze for a weapons conviction. 67 While incarcerated, he became a bloc
commander of incarcerated members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”), a
loyalist paramilitary organization.68 After being released, he stole £1,350 from
coworkers and was thereafter sentenced to death in absentia by a UVF court60

EWING & GEARTY, supra note 19, at 229.
See infra notes 65–77 and accompanying text (discussing changes in trial procedures).
62
See generally STEVEN C. GREER, SUPERGRASSES: A STUDY IN ANTI-TERRORIST LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1995); JAMES MORTON, SUPERGRASSES AND INFORMERS
(2002); DERMOT P.J. WALSH, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1983).
63
See Emergency Provisions Act, 1978, c.3, §§ 7(1)–(3) (Eng.) (providing for juryless trials
for scheduled offenses and the jurisdictional reach of Diplock Courts as equivalent to that of a jury
trial); HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 55, at 101 (discussing the context of the Diplock Courts).
The term was first coined in London during the 1970s. Evidently the nickname for an informer is
“grass” which derives itself from “grasshopper;” rhythmic slang for “copper” which is Cockney
terminology for policeman. GREER, supra note 62, at 1, n.1.
64
GREER, supra note 62, at 252.
65
Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States, 27
MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 414 (2006).
66
GREER, supra note 62, at 61.
67
Id. at 61–62.
68
Id. at 62.
61

File: Baldwin and Koslosky

Created on: 12/2/2011 3:34:00 PM

Last Printed: 12/6/2011 12:15:00 PM

2012]

MISSION CREEP

681

martial. 69 As a result, Mr. Bennett informed police of incriminating evidence on
eighteen UVF associates. 70
A subsequent prosecution and trial of the eighteen defendants charged
with various terrorism-related offenses was entirely reliant on Mr. Bennett’s
testimony. 71 Yet, there was no official disclosure by the Royal Ulster Constabulary or Director of Public Prosecutions of the nature of the immunity agreement.
In fact, the only proof of the actual existence of immunity was Mr. Bennett’s
own testimony. 72 The presiding trial judge, Justice Murray, acknowledged that
Mr. Bennett’s character was conducive of committing perjury. 73 The defense
argued that the Crown was required, under the common law, to demonstrate that
a crime had occurred and that the accused was implicated in its commission. 74
The court summarily rejected these arguments and held that supergrass testimony need not be corroborated. 75
Justice Murray found all but two of the eighteen defendants guilty despite multiple discrepancies in Bennett’s testimony. 76 It was held that there was
independent corroboration of Mr. Bennett’s testimony with regard to three of
the defendants: they simply didn’t say anything to the police. That is, the defendants’ silence was taken as “significant admission of involvement” as was permitted under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. 77 Justice Murray was persuaded
that Mr. Bennett had lied about several facts but held the fabrications to be
“extraneous” and refused to exclude the testimony in its entirety. 78
The sacrifices to civil liberties made in response to the emergency continued as the “temporary” legislation was renewed and expanded.79 A Diplock
trial was used to secure a conviction as recently as 2005, seven years after the
69

Id.
R. v. Graham, [1983] 7 N.I.J.B. 23, 25–26. At trial Mr. Bennett stated that he “did not want
to go to prison again” and that his safety “depended on [the] ability to name as many [people] as
possible.” Id.
71
GREER, supra note 62, at 62–63.
72
Id. at 63–64.
73
Graham, 7 N.I.J.B. at 69.
74
See R. v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K.B. 658 (Eng. A.C.).
75
The exception carved out by the court allows the independent evidence requirement that a
meeting took place to include meeting for unrelated, benign purposes. GREER, supra note 62, at
65.
76
Id. at 67 (sixteen of the eighteen defendants were in the trial; two were found guilty without
Bennet’s testimony).
77
Graham, 7 N.I.J.B. at 74.
78
Id. at 87–88.
79
See, e.g., R. v. Gibney, [1983] 13 N.I.J.B. 1. There were instances where supergrass trials
were described as “nothing short of public spectacle.” GREER, supra note 62, at 71. Greer notes
examples of over thirty defendants in the dock being convicted on the uncorroborated testimony
of one witness. Id. at 71–72. Also present at the various cases were up to seventy heavily-armed
police per courtroom, judges sporting bullet-proof vests during proceedings, and media coverage
describing the very survival of Northern Ireland as contingent on the verdicts. Id.
70
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official end of the Northern Ireland conflict.80 After the attacks of September 11,
the original seven day detention, once described as draconian, was extended to
indefinite incarceration without charge.81 What can be said, however, is that an
external judicial check on the criminal process in Northern Ireland, and the
United Kingdom generally—the European Court of Human Rights—was able
to, at least somewhat, curtail the British legal metamorphosis to at least some
extent. 82 Without an external, independent judicial check on special police powers the deprivation of due process may have been much more substantial.
B.

Responding to the Threat: The Case of the United States

In contrast to the British experience, mission creep in American national
security law did not arise from one primary threat. Rather, its roots are grounded
in how the judiciary responded to numerous types of necessities from drugs in
schools to money laundering to the safety of beat officers. There are three primary topics that warrant exploration in the context of national security: special
needs exceptions, willful blindness jurisprudence, and legislative curtailment of
habeas corpus. Each of these topics is unique in its design and application.
However, each served as a key component in the construction of America’s domestic security regime and continues to inform its operation.

80
R. v. Abbas Boutrab, [2005] NICC 36. Mr. Boutrab was convicted in a Diplock Court in
Belfast for being a member of Al-Qaeda.
81
See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.). Part IV authorized the
indefinite detention of a person certified by the Home Secretary as a terrorist or threat to national
security. The internment power was incorporated into the immigration control laws and is reviewable by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. Evidence obtained by torture thereby is
admissible in the administrative immigration tribunals otherwise excluded from criminal proceedings. In A, X, & Y & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, Lord Wolff, held that indefinite detention did not violate the European
Convention on Human Rights. EWCA (Civ.) 1502 (2002). See Helen Fenwick, The AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September?, 65 MOD.
L. REV. 724, 730–35 (2002); Philip A. Thomas, 9/11: USA and UK, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1193
(2002).
82
See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989) 117. In Brogan, the European
Court for Human Rights (“ECtHR”) held that the detention of suspects in Northern Ireland for
between five and six days violated Article 5(3) of the European Convention of Human Rights.
Article 5(3) of the Convention provides in part that “[e]veryone arrested or detained . . . shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.” Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art.
5(3). Moreover, the ECtHR held in Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978) 25, that the
“five techniques”—wall-standing, hooding, continuous noise, deprivation of food, and deprivation
of sleep—used by British authorities in interrogations in Northern Ireland violated the European
Court of Human Rights.
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1.

Special Needs Exceptions

Terrorism is not the only circumstance in which a court is willing to apply a lesser degree of privacy protection in order to protect against a prospective
or perceived danger. In the United States, numerous circumstances have arisen
which have led courts to find a lesser expectation of privacy or carve out a special exception to an individual’s established privacy rights. One such exception
has arisen under numerous circumstances to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.83 This “special needs exception” was first elaborated in Terry v.
Ohio. 84
In Terry, the Supreme Court considered whether a police officer could
conduct a “stop and frisk” without probable cause and prior to any crime being
committed. 85 The case arose from a criminal prosecution of two defendants for
carrying a concealed weapon in Cleveland, Ohio. 86 The officer testified that he
observed the defendants slowly pacing along several storefronts. This midafternoon “casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window” elicited
suspicion by the officer who confronted the men. 87 Upon patting the defendants’
outer clothing, the officer discovered a revolver. 88
The Supreme Court affirmed the state appeals court in distinguishing
between an investigatory stop and an arrest, 89 and between a weapons frisk and
a full-blown evidentiary search.90 The Supreme Court was at pains to stress that
it was not retreating from its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requiring police
to “obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.” 91 Thus, the Fourth Amendment did apply to “stop and frisk”
83

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment may not be used as evidence in criminal proceedings).
84
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
85
Id. at 10–11.
86
Id. at 4–5.
87
Id. at 6.
88
Id. at 7.
89
See State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (noting that “[t]o constitute
an ‘arrest,’ four requisites are involved: A purpose to take the person into custody of the law;
under real or pretended authority and an actual or constructive seizure of detention of his person,
so understood by the person arrested.” (quoting State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 225 P. 1000,
1001–02 (Mont. 1924))).
90
Id. at 120. The appellate court noted that:
We must be careful to distinguish that the “frisk” authorized herein includes
only a “frisk” for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for
contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable
grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is essential.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
91
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. The Court positively cited its previous holdings: Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), and Chapman v. United States,
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searches. 92 However, the traditional standard of probable cause applicable to
searches did not apply; rather, the Court looked to the “reasonableness” of the
officer’s actions in light of the circumstances.93
The Supreme Court, in determining reasonableness, balanced the invasion of personal privacy that the search entails against an officer’s need to detect
for weapons. 94 The Court found, on balance, the interest in “effective law enforcement” outweighed the “minor inconvenience and petty indignity” of a stop
and frisk search, 95 with the caveat that a weapons search “be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”96 That is to say, the search
“must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons.” 97
Presumably a search that went beyond the scope of where weapons might be
concealed would be unconstitutional absent probable cause.
Educational institutions have also presented a petri dish for cultivating
special needs exceptions. New Jersey v. T.L.O. 98 involved the constitutionality
of a school official’s search of a student’s purse.99 After a high school freshman
was discovered smoking in a bathroom, her purse was searched and drug paraphernalia and a small amount of marijuana was discovered. 100 The student was
charged with illegally possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute. 101
Building upon the balancing of interests outlined in Terry, the New Jersey court
concluded that the search was reasonable under the circumstances in light of the
need to preserve school discipline and order.102
365 U.S. 610 (1961) for the notion that it was not seeking to reign in the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. Id.
92
Id. at 19.
93
Id. (noting that the “central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—[is] the reasonableness
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security”).
94
Id. at 21. The Court held that:
In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary “first to focus upon the governmental interest
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,” for there is “no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize)
against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.”
Id. at 20–21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37 (1967)).
95
Id. at 10–11 (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (N.Y. 1964)). See id. at 26 (stating that”[t]he protective search for weapons . . . constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person”).
96
Id. at 25–26 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
97
Id. at 26.
98
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
99
Id. at 327–32.
100
Id. at 328.
101
See State ex rel T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1329 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel., 1980).
102
Id. at 1333–34.
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The Supreme Court agreed; a Terry construction of the Fourth Amendment governed searches of students by school officials. 103 The Court acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment protects students’ privacy vis-à-vis school
officials. 104 Yet, a schoolchild’s “legitimate” expectation of privacy is weighed
against the school’s need to maintain an environment in which learning can take
place. 105 The Court found the warrant requirement unsuitable in a school setting,
which required “some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public
authorities are ordinarily subject . . . as well as a modification of the level of
suspicion . . . needed to justify a search.” 106 Because the probable cause requirement would likely “frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search,” 107 only a showing of reasonableness was required. 108 The Supreme
Court articulated a two-part test derived from Terry: (1) the action had to be
“justified at its inception,” 109 and (2) the search had to be “reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 110
Only then was a search based on a suspicion less than probable cause justified
under the Fourth Amendment.
Interestingly, the Court in T.L.O., as it did in Terry, relied on Camara v.
Municipal Court of San Francisco111 for justifying that the reasonableness standard attach to searches under certain circumstances. Yet, in Camara, the Supreme Court held that a warrant based on probable cause was needed prior to an
inspector conducting an examination of a private residence.112 Arguments that
the routine, safeguard-laden inspections were not intrusive and that a warrant
requirement would hinder the progress and purpose of the inspections “unduly

103

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. The Court noted that:
In a number of cases [it had] recognized the legality of searches and seizures
based on suspicions that, although “reasonable,” do not rise to the level of
probable cause . . . . Where a careful balancing of governmental and private
interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have
not hesitated to adopt such a standard.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
104
Id. at 334. Justice White, speaking for the majority, rejected the notion that because school
administrators act in loco parentis “their authority is that of the parent, not the State, and is therefore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 336 (citing R.C.M. v. State, 660
S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983)).
105
Id. at 339–40.
106
Id. at 340.
107
Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532–33 (1967)).
108
Id. at 341.
109
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
110
Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
111
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
112
Id. at 540.
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discount[ed]” the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. 113
Yet, those arguments rejected in cases of health and safety inspections were
later accepted in the case of officer protection and school discipline.
The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the authority of a school district to require suspicion-less drug tests for students participating in extracurricular programs. In both Board of Education v. Earls 114 and Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton, 115 the Supreme Court found that the interest of deterring
drug use by students outweighed the intrusion of a urine-based drug test. 116
Based on the rationale of T.L.O., the Court evermore stressed the context of the
search as dispositive of its constitutionality. 117 The Supreme Court looked to
other non-school special needs exceptions indicating that the doctrine had greater implications than the confines of T.L.O. 118 The Court also signaled that the
probable cause standard was applicable primarily to the narrow context of criminal law.119 Where an “administrative search” is prophylactic, the probable
cause standard may be ill suited to determine the reasonableness of the
search. 120

113

Id. at 531–32.
536 U.S. 822 (2002).
115
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
116
Earls, 536 U.S. at 838; Acton, 515 U.S. at 664–65.
117
In Acton, Justice Scalia noted:
Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student athletes.
School sports are not for the bashful. They require “suiting up” before each
practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy
they afford. . . . By choosing to “go out for the team,” [students] voluntarily
subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on
students generally. . . . Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a
“closely regulated industry,” students who voluntarily participate in school
athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges,
including privacy.
515 U.S. at 657. Yet in Earls, the Supreme Court found that students participating in voluntary,
non-athletic activities also subjected themselves to a lesser expectation of privacy. 536 U.S. at
831–32. Cf. id. at 845 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that extracurricular activities are “part of
the school’s educational program” and that “[p]articipation in such activities is a key component
of school life, essential in reality for students applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience”).
118
The Supreme Court in Acton cited four examples: National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding a policy of random drug testing of federal customs
officers); Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding police
checkpoints targeting drunk drivers); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (upholding
checkpoints searching for illegal immigrants); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding random drug testing of railroad employees). 515 U.S. at 653–54.
119
Earls, 536 U.S. at 828.
120
Id. The Court noted that “[i]n certain limited circumstances, the Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling
114
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The Supreme Court further distinguished constitutional standards of
drug testing policies designed to limit involvement and those designed purely to
affect an arrest by law enforcement. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,121 the
Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”) had enacted a policy of testing
pregnant patients for cocaine and then alerting police of positive tests.122 The
policy—Policy M-7—provided that pregnant patients would be given a warrantless drug test without their consent if they met one or more of a set of criteria
with regard to their pregnancy. 123 If the patient tested positive for cocaine before
or after labor, police were notified, and the woman would be subject to prosecution for criminal offenses ranging from possession to child neglect. 124
It was not asserted that the nine factors under which a patient could be
tested for cocaine gave rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 125 The
Supreme Court distinguished previous cases in which it upheld warrantless drug
testing. 126 Inherent to a patient’s expectation of privacy in a hospital setting was
that his or her diagnostic tests were private and not disclosed to third parties or
law enforcement without consent. 127 More fundamental was the nature of the
special need. Previous special needs exceptions were upheld when their “justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced
from the State's general interest in law enforcement.” 128 The critical component
of Policy M-7 was the “use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment.” 129 The operation of the policy was “ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.” 130 As such, it ran afoul of
the Fourth Amendment.

to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of
individualized suspicion.” Id. at 829 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668).
121
532 U.S. 67 (2001).
122
Id. at 69–72.
123
Id. at 71 n.4 (noting that under Policy M-7, pregnant women would be given a drug test if
they had: “1) No prenatal care, 2) Late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation, 3) Incomplete prenatal care, 4) Abruptio placentae, 5) Intrauterine fetal death, 6) Preterm labor ‘of no obvious
cause’, 7) IUGR [intrauterine growth retardation] ‘of no obvious cause’, 8) Previously known
drug or alcohol abuse, 9) Unexplained congenital anomalies”).
124
Id. at 72–73.
125
Id. at 76–77.
126
Id. at 77–78.
127
Id. at 78.
128
Id. at 79, 80 n.17 (stating that the special needs exception “as used in Skinner and Von Raab
. . . was used to describe a basis for a search apart from the regular needs of law enforcement”).
129
Id. at 80.
130
Id. at 81 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)).
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Prosecuting “Willful Blindness”

The development of willful blindness jurisprudence has made it easier
to sustain criminal convictions, as illustrated by the case of Ellen Campbell.
Ellen Campbell was a real estate agent in Mooresville, North Carolina. 131 Over
the course of a few weeks she had showed several upscale houses to Mark Lawing, a gaudy, soon-to-be-indicted drug trafficker posing as a businessman. 132
Lawing eventually decided to purchase a home priced at $182,500. 133 Unable to
secure a loan in light of his criminal activities, Lawing paid $60,000 in undisclosed cash, through Ms. Campbell, to the home seller in return for a lower selling price of an equivalent amount. 134 Ms. Campbell was convicted of, inter alia,
money laundering and engaging in a transaction involving criminally derived
property despite not having the explicit knowledge of Lawing’s criminal activities. 135
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 136 Although it acknowledged that the money laundering statute required actual subjective knowledge on the part of the defendant, 137 the appeals court assessed
whether Ms. Campbell was willfully blind to the nature of the transaction. 138
The physical appearance and conduct of Mr. Lawing was sufficient, according
to the court, so that a “reasonable jury could have found that Campbell was willfully blind to the fact that Lawing was a drug dealer and the . . . property was
intended, at least in part, to conceal the proceeds of Lawing's drug selling operation.” 139

131

United States v. Campbell (Campbell I), 777 F. Supp. 1259, 1260–61 (W.D. N.C. 1991).
Id. at 1261. The trial court gave significant note to Mr. Lawing’s lifestyle, how he often
arrived gold-clad in one of two Porsches, and on one occasion brought $20,000 in cash to a home
viewing to demonstrate he had the financial means to purchase an upscale lake home. Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 1260. The money laundering statute reads as follows:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location,
the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2006) (making it a crime to
“knowingly engage[] or attempt[] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000”).
136
United States v. Campbell (Campbell II), 977 F.2d 854, 855 (1992).
137
Id. at 857.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 859.
132
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The doctrine of willful blindness, or as it may be termed, “deliberate ignorance” or “conscious avoidance,” is not new. Willful blindness was incorporated into the first draft of the Model Penal Code and exists there still.140 Different courts have articulated various rationales for the doctrine. 141 Willful blindness requires juries to deduce the subjective knowledge of the defendant rather
than weigh what a reasonable person under the defendant’s circumstances
would do. 142 The Supreme Court has held that “reasonable inferences from evidence of defendant's conduct” can be drawn to “find the requisite knowledge on
defendant’s part.” 143 Jurisdictions are varied on how loose or tight they are regarding what information the jury may use to infer guilt. Thus, prosecutions
resting on a theory of willful blindness risk doctrinal overbreath and an inconsistent application of justice. Moreover, prosecutions of conspiracy also risk
forum shopping between various district and circuit courts based on the ease
with which criminal evidence may be introduced.
Willful blindness prosecutions often permit an inconsistent introduction
of evidence that may otherwise have been barred as extrinsic to the crime
charged. 144 For instance in United States v. Freeman,145 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction of, inter alia, twenty-two counts of money laundering and one count of conspiracy involving a Ponzi scheme. 146 The
defendants comingled funds derived from selling $17 million in bogus “private
140

The relevant section of the Model Penal Code reads: “When knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(7) (1981). See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 129-30 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)). The Supreme Court has
applied the language of Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) to various criminal statutes. See Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845 n.10 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 n.29
(1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969).
141
See, e.g., United States v. Adeniji, 31 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The rationale for the
conscious avoidance doctrine is that ‘a defendant’s affirmative efforts to ‘see no evil’ and ‘hear no
evil’ do not somehow magically invest him with the ability to ‘do no evil.’’”) (quoting United
States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 218 n.26 (2d Cir. 1987)); United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d
184, 189 (7th Cir.1986) (stating that “actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge
are the same thing”); Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700 (opining that the “substantive justification for the
rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable”).
142
See United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 508 (3d Cir. 2003) (willful blindness instructions are proper when the defendant was “subjectively aware of the high probability of the fact in
question, and not merely that a reasonable man would have been aware of the probability”); United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that “the judge’s version of the
‘deliberate ignorance’ instruction must make clear that the defendant himself was subjectively
aware of the high probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man would
have been aware of the probability”).
143
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 n.19 (1994). See also Spies v. United States, 317
U.S. 492, 499–500 (1943).
144
See FED. R. EVID. 403(a)–(b), 404(a)–(b).
145
434 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2005).
146
Id. at 372–73, 382.
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placement secured trading programs” and “insulin contracts” investments. 147 On
appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in introducing testimony
regarding the “insulin contracts” Ponzi as it was not intrinsic to the charged offenses contained in the indictment.148 The Fifth Circuit rejected the contention
that the evidence of the second Ponzi scheme was inadmissible as extrinsic. 149
The court noted that even though the evidence introduced was of acts other than
those related to the offense, it was intrinsic “when the evidence of the other act
and the evidence of the crime charged are ‘inextricably intertwined’ or both acts
are part of a ‘single criminal episode’ or the other acts were ‘necessary preliminaries’ to the crime charged.” 150
The court also upheld the willful blindness jury instruction because a
“proper factual basis” for the jury instruction was established at trial. 151 Such a
proper factual basis exists if the “record supports inferences that ‘(1) the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal
conduct.’” 152 Indeed, the court noted that the “wealth of evidence” presented at
trial supported an inference that the defendant subjectively knew that he was
involved in illicit activity. 153 It did not matter that the prosecution proceeded on
a theory of actual knowledge over the course of the trial. 154 The Fifth Circuit
noted that “deliberate indifference instruction is not inconsistent with evidence
of actual knowledge.” 155
Other courts of appeal have varied as to when a deliberate indifference
jury instruction is appropriate. The Second Circuit permits a “conscious avoidance” jury instruction if (1) “the defendant asserts the lack of some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction,” and (2) “‘the evidence is such that a
rational juror may reach [the] conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that
[the defendant] was aware of a high probability [of the fact in dispute] and consciously avoided confirming that fact.’” 156 The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, permits such a jury instruction where the defendant “asserts a lack of guilty knowledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.”157 Simi147

Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 374.
149
Id.
150
Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal citations
omitted)).
151
Id. at 378.
152
Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d 916, 922 (5th Cir. 1998)).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 379.
156
United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993)).
157
United States v. Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981, 993 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Hildebrand, 152 F.3d 756, 764 (8th Cir. 1998)).
148
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larly, the Tenth Circuit permits a willful blindness jury instruction “when the
prosecution presents evidence that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid
learning all the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent
prosecution.” 158 A panel of the Ninth Circuit articulated a relatively high standard permitting a jury instruction only when “specific evidence” is presented
that the defendant “‘(1) actually suspected that he or she might be involved in
criminal activity, (2) deliberately avoided taking steps to confirm or deny those
suspicions, and (3) did so in order to provide himself or herself with a defense in
the event of prosecution.’” 159
Perhaps the root of the inconsistency is that federal courts have articulated varying conceptualizations of what constitutes willful blindness. Some
courts have seen willful blindness as a function of probability. A willful blindness instruction is appropriate “where the defendant ‘suspects a fact, realizes its
probability, but refrains from obtaining final confirmation in order to be able to
deny knowledge if apprehended.’” 160 Other courts have viewed willful blindness
as an actual theory of knowledge that satisfies the scienter requirement of a
criminal offense.161 What is certain, however, is that the development and proliferation of willful blindness prosecutions has made it easier to sustain criminal
convictions where the circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct give rise
to an increased suspicion of guilt where the underlying conduct does not support
a conviction based on the mens rea requirement of the offense.

158

United States v. Espinoza, 244 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999).
159
United States v. Heredia, 429 F.3d 820, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Baron, 94 F.3d 1312, 1318 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996)), overruled by United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d
913, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the “deliberately avoided” element of the twopronged jury instruction is sufficient that the Baron three-pronged jury instruction that included
motive is discarded).
160
See Heredia, 429 F.3d at 824 (quoting United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir.
1992)). See also United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 651–52 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that a
jury instruction “should not be given unless there is evidence to ‘support the inference that the
defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely
contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent
prosecution’”) (quoting United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1987)); United
States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury that actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge are the same).
161
See United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 148 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the “willful blindness theory of knowledge”); United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding willful blindness to be a “subjective state of mind that is deemed to satisfy the scienter requirement of knowledge”) (quoting United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 808 (3d
Cir. 1994)).
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Pre-September 11 Statutory Responses

Times of war or national crisis precipitate the need—or the perception
of need—for more stringent law enforcement measures. 162 Political pressure
makes elected officials eager to demonstrate their commitment and competency
in handling or responding to a threat. As was the case with their British counterparts with the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act and its progeny, the American
Congress has not hesitated to legislate stricter law enforcement measures in response to a terrorist incident. One example is the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 163
In 1994, Representative Don Edwards successfully added a small provision to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 164 The
rider required that “investigation[s] may not be initiated or continued . . . based
on activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution, including
expressions of support or provision of financial support for the nonviolent political, religious, philosophical or ideological goals or beliefs of any person or
group.” 165 The prohibition, however, was to have a short life. In April 1995, a
large truck bomb detonated outside the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, killing 168 people. As a result of that incident and the impending Presidential election cycle, the AEDPA was signed into law by President Clinton.166
The 1996 Act expressly revoked the Edwards Amendment and allowed
“guilt by association” to re-enter the national security discourse of the United
States. 167 Under the AEDPA, the Secretary of State could designate any group
as terrorist 168 even though that group engaged in both lawful and unlawful activities. 169 Providing any “material support” to any organization designated as en162

See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
164
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2022 (1994). For a background of the Act see DAVID COLE &
JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 102–05 (The New Press 3d ed. 2006).
165
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2022 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(c)(2)
(2000), amended by AEPDA § 323).
166
COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 164, at 131–32.
167
See AEDPA § 323 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)); McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L.
108-198, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (adding Communism to the list of ideologies that could make an
immigrant deportable and excludable). The McCarran-Walter Act was declared unconstitutional
in 1989 by the District Court for the Central District of California. See Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part sub nom., Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.
1991), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501
(9th Cir. 1991); see generally David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J. L. & RELIGION 267 (2001) (arguing that the use of secret procedures and guilt by association in immigration trials is unconstitutional and counterproductive).
168
AEDPA § 302(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2000).
169
COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 164, at 139–42.
163
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gaged in terrorist activities became a criminal offense. 170 Moreover, financial
institutions possessing funds of a suspect organization are obligated to report
their existence. 171 The power of the Secretary of State pursuant to the AEDPA is
functionally equivalent to the proscription provisions in the original 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act and its progeny. Groups are targeted because of their
ideological orientation and the geopolitical disposition of their respective governments.
Thirty organizations were originally designated by the Secretary of
State as terrorist. Two of the organizations were the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(“PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”). Two American
citizens, one an administrative law judge, formed the Humanitarian Law Project
(“HLP”), a non-profit organization “dedicated to furthering international compliance with humanitarian law and human rights law and the peaceful resolution
of armed conflicts.”172 HLP was given consultative status with the United Nations and sought to assist the PKK in revealing humanitarian abuses on the Kurdish people in Eastern Turkey. 173
The AEDPA effectively precluded the HLP from supporting the PKK,
which led to a constitutional challenge of the legislation. In Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno (HLP II), 174 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the AEDPA did not violate the First Amendment protection of freedom of association. 175 The court stated that the AEDPA did not curtail the expressive conduct of those who affiliated with the HLP, but rather was aimed at preventing
terrorism. 176 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that strict scrutiny was inappropriate. 177 Moreover, the circuit court held that the AEDPA did not grant the
Secretary of State “unfettered discretion” to limit the association with certain
organizations. 178 The plaintiffs in the case argued that the Secretary of State’s
170

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). This section provides “[w]hoever knowingly provides
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both . . . .” Id. (emphasis
added). “Material support” is broadly defined as “currency . . . or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . , transportation, . . .
except medicine or religious materials.” § 2339A(b).
171
§ 2339B(a)(2)(A)–(B), (b). The civil penalty for non-compliance is the greater of $50,000 or
twice the value of the amount the financial institution was required to report. § 2339B(b)(A)–(B).
172
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (HLP I), 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
173
HLP sought to do this by (1) soliciting funds, (2) advocating on behalf of the PKK in the US
Congress, (3) training PKK members how to seek redress for violations of humanitarian law, (4)
advocating on behalf of political prisoners, (5) holding press conferences, and (6) providing lodging for PKK visitors. Id. at 1182.
174
205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
175
Id. at 1138.
176
Id. at 1135.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 1137.
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decision was effectively unreviewable.179 The court held that there was, at least
formally, review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 180 The likelihood of success was not a great concern for the court because deference to the executive branch is “a necessary concomitant of the foreign affairs power.” 181
What is perhaps most significant, however, is that the AEDPA greatly
restricted habeas corpus claims. Called “the most celebrated writ in English
law,” 182 habeas corpus predates the Constitution as a component of colonial law.
Habeas corpus was prominently featured in the discussions of the delegates at
the Constitutional Convention.183 Ultimately, the writ would be codified in Article I of the Constitution 184 and section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.185
The procedural requirements of habeas corpus review were significantly
increased by the AEDPA. Existing constitutional jurisprudence was modified by
the Act; the deference usually afforded to state court application of facts was
dramatically increased via statute. In Brown v. Allen, 186 the Supreme Court considered the effect of a denial of certiorari to review a state supreme court decision upholding a criminal conviction on a habeas corpus petition to a federal
district court. 187 The Court turned to the status of the facts as determined by a
state court in a subsequent habeas petition after affirming that a denial of certi-

179

Id.
Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c).
181
HLP II, 205 F.3d at 1137.
182
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129 (1791).
183
Max Rosenn, The Great Writ—A Reflection of Social Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 339
(1983).
184
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
185
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81. Section 14 also provided that
either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district
courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of commitment.—Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into
court to testify.
Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).
186
344 U.S. 443 (1953), abrogated by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312–13 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Res, 504 U.S. 1, 4 (1992), superseded by statute 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(2) as amended by the AEDPA, as recognized in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434
(2000) (“the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney’s threshold standard of diligence, so
that prisoners who would have had to satisfy Keeney’s test for excusing the deficiency in the statecourt record prior to the AEDPA are now controlled by § 2254(e)(2)”).
187
Id. at 446–47.
180
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orari “‘imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case.’” 188 Justice
Reed’s opinion stated that “[w]here the record of the application affords an adequate opportunity to weigh the sufficiency of the allegations and the evidence,
and no unusual circumstances calling for a hearing are presented, a repetition of
trial is not required.” 189 Thus, if no “vital flaw [is] found in the process of ascertaining such facts in the State court,” a district court may accept them in a subsequent habeas petition. 190
Yet the AEDPA added a requirement that state court factual determinations “shall be presumed to be correct.” 191 The habeas petitioner “shall have the
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 192 Federal courts can only hold an evidentiary hearing if two criteria are
satisfied. 193 First, the petitioner must demonstrate “that the claim relies on a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or . . . a factual predicate
that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 194 The petitioner must then prove that “the facts underlying the claim . .
. would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant
guilty of the underlying offense.” 195
The AEDPA also significantly curtails the ability of petitioners to bring
multiple habeas claims. Prior to 1996, it was significantly easier for criminal
defendants to file subsequent habeas claims. The Warren Court held that a subsequent habeas petition could only be denied under three conditions. First, “the
same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely
to the applicant on the prior application.”196 Second, the previous denial of ha188

Id. at 456 (quoting House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945)); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.
Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) (stating that “this is a jurisdiction to be exercised
sparingly, and only in cases of peculiar gravity and general importance, or in order to secure uniformity of decision.”).
189
Id. at 463.
190
Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) abrogated by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
312–13 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Res, 504 U.S. 1, 4 (1992), superseded by statute
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) as amended by the AEDPA, as recognized in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
420, 434 (2000) (“the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney’s threshold standard of
diligence, so that prisoners who would have had to satisfy Keeney’s test for excusing the deficiency in the state-court record prior to the AEDPA are now controlled by § 2254(e)(2)”). The Supreme Court noted that a state court’s factual determinations “may have been made after hearing
witnesses perhaps no longer available or whose recollection later may have been affected by the
passage of time or by the fact that one judicial determination has already been made.” Id.
191
AEDPA § 104(4), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006).
192
Id.
193
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2006).
194
§ 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B)(i).
195
§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
196
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).
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beas relief “must have rested on an adjudication of the merits of the ground presented in the subsequent application.” 197 Third, “the ends of justice would not be
served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.”198
The Supreme Court increased the standard by which a successive habeas claim would be permitted. The Supreme Court considered the applicability
and standard of the abuse of the writ doctrine—the circumstances under which
an issue is raised for the first time in a second petition—to habeas claims in
McCleskey v. Zant. 199 The Supreme Court held that for a criminal defendant to
assert a subsequent claim, he or she must first show cause, that is “‘some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim in
state court.’” 200 Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that “‘actual prejudice’” resulted from the errors raised in the habeas petition.201
Yet the AEDPA increased the requirements that a petitioner must meet
prior to having a federal court hear a subsequent habeas claim. First, a petitioner
has only one year to file for habeas relief from a state court judgment. 202 This
limitation is further reduced in capital cases where a defendant is deemed to
have been provided adequate representation in collateral proceedings. 203 The
Act also provided that “[b]efore a second or successive application . . . is filed in
the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for
an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”204 The petitioner must make a prima facie case that his or her case comports with the increased standards of habeas review. 205 In addition to the presumption of factual
validity, relief is available only when a state court judgment is “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”206 Relief is unavailable on
197

Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
199
499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991).
200
Id. at 493 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). The Supreme Court elaborated that “objective factors” that meet the threshold of cause include “‘interference by officials’
that makes compliance with the state's procedural rule impracticable, and ‘a showing that the
factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.’ . . . In addition, constitutionally ‘ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause.’” Id. at 493–94 (quoting Murray, 477
U.S. at 486–88 (internal citations omitted)).
201
Id. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982)).
202
AEDPA § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006).
203
AEDPA § 107(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2263 (2006). Such applicant has 180 days to file a
petition. Id.
204
AEDPA § 106(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2006). See also Felker v. Turpin 518 U.S.
651, 664 (1996) (upholding the requirement that a habeas petitioner obtain leave from a circuit
court of appeals prior to filing a second habeas petition).
205
AEDPA § 106(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) (2006).
206
AEDPA § 104(3), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). See also Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266,
273 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that Teague determination, assessing the retroactivity of a new
constitutional principle asserted in a habeas petition, is required under AEDPA); Teague v. Lane,
198
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the ground that a state court misapplied constitutional principles to the specific
facts of a case. 207
III. LAW, FINANCIAL CRIMES, AND THE “WAR ON TERROR”
Both the AEDPA and the criminalization policy in Northern Ireland
highlight the unique ability of emergency legislation to seep into and alter ordinary law, be it civil or criminal. On September 11, 2001, approximately 3,000
individuals died as a result of the worst terrorist attack on American soil. Inquiries into the causes, nature, and future prevention of terrorism focused, in large
part, on the financing of terrorist operations. It was estimated that the September
11 attacks were financed by between $400,000 and $500,000. 208 This relatively
small amount of funding required to produce a massively devastating attack
became a chief concern of foreign, domestic, and international policymakers.
On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1373. 209 The chief operational goal of Resolution 1373 was to
“[p]revent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.” 210 The resolution di489 U.S. 288, 310–13 (1989) (requiring that a new principle of constitutional law, which petitioner asserts, be applicable retroactively), superseded by statute, AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214, as recognized in Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 46 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that “[p]rior to the passage of the AEDPA . . . Teague and its subsequent decisions dictated that when a prisoner sought federal habeas corpus relief based upon a principle announced
after a final judgment, federal courts were required to look at whether the state court’s decision
relied on an ‘old rule’ . . . or whether it imposed a ‘new rule.’”).
207
AEDPA § 104(3), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006). Section 2254(d) provides
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
§ 2254(d)(1)–(2).
208
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, COMPLETE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 172 (2004). Similarly, relatively small amounts of funding were required to
support terrorist operations in Northern Ireland. The yearly operating budgets for the IRA and
Ulster Volunteer Force were £1.5 million and £1-2 million respectively. SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS, THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND, FOURTH
REPORT OF SESSION (H.C. 978-I, 2002) tbl. 1 at 18, available at http://www.parliament.thestationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmniaf/978/978.pdf. Smaller paramilitary group
such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters and Ulster Defense Association had annual operating costs of
£250,000 and £500,000 respectively. Id.
209
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement.
210
Id. at art. 1(a).
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rected states to “[c]riminalize the wilful [sic] provision or collection . . . of funds
by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should
be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist acts.” 211 States were also to freeze funds used for acts of terrorism and to
prevent funds from being made available to individuals involved in terrorism. 212
The British response to Resolution 1373 was the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act of 2001; 213 the United States responded with the USA PATRIOT
Act. 214
A.

Traditional Notions of Bank Secrecy

The American legislative experience regarding bank secrecy and financial privacy has been the quest to balance the needs of customer confidentiality
with crime prevention. 215 Bank customers have traditionally been afforded an
implicit common law right to financial privacy. 216 The federal judiciary has not,
however, recognized a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to financial
statements. 217
American notions of financial privacy are markedly different from those
of Europe. The roots of European bank secrecy grew out of a much stronger
notion of necessity. 218 Post-WWI hyperinflation and political instability led individuals to hold assets in stable banking systems and financial markets outside
of their home countries. 219 Germany promulgated a 1933 law which stated that,
under a penalty of death, individuals were required to report all assets held outside their jurisdiction of residence.220 As a result, Switzerland enacted the first
modern codified bank secrecy legislation. The aftermath of WWII—economic
211

Id. at art. 1(b).
Id. at arts. 1(c)–(d).
213
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).
214
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 313, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
215
Eric J. Gouvin, Are There Any Checks and Balances on the Government’s Power to Check
Our Balances? The Fate of Financial Privacy in the War on Terrorism, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 517, 519 (2005).
216
Id.
217
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976) (stating that there is no Fourth
Amendment protection of subpoenaed bank records), superseded by statute, Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–21, as recognized in Hancock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D.
209, 210 (D.D.C. 1980) (noting that the Act “permits individuals to contest Government access to
certain records held by banks and other financial institutions . . . by requiring the Government to
notify the bank customer of the subpoena or summons . . . . [T]he customer may file a motion to
quash in district court.”) (internal citations omitted).
218
See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States’ Assault on Foreign Bank
Secrecy, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 454, 455 (1992).
219
Id.
220
Id.
212
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devastation, social uncertainty, and high tax rates—obliged individuals again to
seek foreign deposit locations. 221
These events in large part led Europe to develop broad-based privacy
protections. Transnational privacy protection initiatives began in 1981 with the
Council of Europe. 222 With the purpose of “secur[ing] in the territory of each
Party for every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his
rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy,” 223 the
Convention was applicable to data in “automated personal data files and automatic processing of personal data in the public and private sectors.”224 The Convention measured by which member states protect data contained in automated
files. As the Convention was not self-executing, each European member state
was to enact implementing legislation to effect its provisions.
The Convention was followed by the European Union’s Data Privacy
Directive. 225 Like the Convention, the Data Privacy Directive is applicable to
member government only after national implementing legislation is enacted.
Unlike its predecessor, the E.U. Directive has two objectives: (1) to protect individuals’ fundamental rights of privacy, and (2) to “neither restrict nor prohibit
the free flow of personal data between Member States.” 226 The Data Privacy
Directive outlined broad criteria for processing data,227 disclosing information to
the “data subject,” 228 ensuring confidentiality of data,229 and transferring data to
third countries. 230
The United Kingdom enacted the Data Protection Act in 1998 to give
effect to the provision of the Data Privacy Directive.231 The Act provides for an
individual’s right to access personal data as well as criteria on the disclosure of
personal information. 232 Yet as was authorized by the Data Privacy Directive 233
221

Id. at 456.
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Council of Europe, Jan. 28, 1981, C.E.T.S. No. 108, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/treaties/html/108.htm.
223
Id. at ch. 1, art 1.
224
Id. at ch. 1, art. 3(1).
225
Council Directive, 95/46, Data Privacy Directive, 1995 O.J. (L 281) [hereinafter Data Privacy Directive].
226
Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(1)–(2).
227
Id. at ch. 2, art. 7.
228
Id. at ch. 2, arts. 10–11.
229
Id. at ch. 2, arts. 16–17.
230
Id. at ch. 4, arts. 25–26.
231
Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.).
232
Id. § 7. See also id. § 10 (governing the disclosure of information “likely to cause damage
or distress”); id. art. 13 (outlining compensation to unauthorized disclosure of data).
233
Data Privacy Directive, supra note 225, ch. 2, art. 13(1)(a) (providing that “Member States
may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the obligations and rights . . . when such a
restriction constitutes a necessary measures to safeguard . . . national security”).
222
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an exception was made for the disclosure of information in the name of national
security. 234 The exemption requires that a certificate certify that the purpose of a
disclosure of information identified by a “general description,” was made for
national security purposes. 235 An individual “directly affected” by the disclosure
of personal information may file an appeal to quash the certificate upon a finding that the “Minister did not have reasonable grounds for issuing the certificate.” 236
In contrast to the European Union, and by extension the United Kingdom, the United States has predominantly taken a sectoral approach to privacy,
providing differentiated levels of protection to various areas of substantive
law. 237 The first modern American financial privacy legislation was the Bank
Secrecy Act. 238 Passed in 1970, the Bank Secrecy Act required financial institutions to keep records of their clients’ financial activities. Specifically, financial
institutions were required to report every transaction in excess of $10,000. 239
Furthermore, the Bank Secrecy Act required insured depository institutions to
establish internal compliance and monitoring procedures, designate an institutional compliance officer, and provide training for employees. 240 The rationale
was that “such records and reports are of a high degree of usefulness in criminal,
tax, and other regulatory investigations.”241

234

Data Protection Act, § 28(1).
Id. § 28(2)–(3).
236
Id. § 28(4)–(5).
237
See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936; Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394;
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507
(amended 1989, 1990); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat.
3195; Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848; Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780; Family Education and
Privacy Rights Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, 88 Stat. 1855.
238
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as 12 U.S.C. §§
1829(b), 1951–1959 (2003); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5322 (2003)).
239
See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2011) (outlining the regulations promulgated by the Treasury
Department under the Bank Secrecy Act). The Bank Secrecy Act first introduced the requirement
of filing “Currency Transactions Reports” (“CTRs”). This practice was later augmented by the
Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act which required banks and other financial institutions to file “Suspicious Activities Report” (“SAR”). Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering
Act, 102 Pub. L. No. 550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified in various sections of 12, 18, 31 and 42
U.S.C.). Financial institutions were required to report “any suspicious transaction relevant to a
possible violation of law or regulation.” 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2006).
240
31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(A)–(C) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 21.21(c) (2003) (describing compliance
procedures for national banks pursuant to the Bank Security Act).
241
12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)(A) (2006). Congress also stated that “microfilm or other reproductions and other records made by insured depository institutions of checks, as well as records kept
by such institutions, of the identity of persons maintaining or authorized to act with respect to
accounts therein, have been of particular value in [criminal proceedings].” § 1829b(a)(1)(B).
235
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Following a backlash to the intrusion into common law financial privacy of deposit holders, 242 Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act. 243
The Right to Financial Privacy Act prohibited the disclosure of an accountholder’s records without consent. 244 Law enforcement and investigative authorities could, however, obtain records without consent pursuant to search warrants,
administrative and judicial subpoenas, or mere written requests. 245 Customers
were usually entitled to notice that records were the subject of a law enforcement investigation with the caveat being that such notice could be delayed by
court order. 246
Somewhat counter-intuitively, the Bank Secrecy Act and the Right to
Financial Privacy Act did not statutorily define the crime of “money laundering.” Money laundering only became a criminal offense under the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. 247 The Act made it a crime to knowingly transfer 248
or conduct a financial transaction with the proceeds of an unlawful activity with
the intent to continue the unlawful activity, 249 evade taxation,250 conceal the
nature of the proceeds, 251 or avoid a reporting requirement.252 Interestingly, the
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 also criminalized money spending. To
knowingly engage “in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a

242

See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) (holding a duty of
confidentiality found in the law of agency); Grainy Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720
(Ct. App. 1978) (stating that there is a duty on the part of a bank not to disclose information regarding the customer’s depository account), aff’d, 411 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1978); Tournier v. National
Provincial and Union Bank of England, [1924] 1 Eng. Rep. 461 (K.B.) (finding a duty of confidentiality based on the law of contract).
243
Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422(1982)).
244
12 U.S.C. § 3402(1) (2006).
245
§§ 3402(2)–(5). Written requests are governed by 12 U.S.C. § 3408, which provides that
they are appropriate when (1) no subpoena “reasonably appears to be available,” (2) the request is
authorized by agency regulations, and (3) “there is reason to believe that the records sought are
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement.” §§ 3408(1)–(3).
246
§ 3409. The records sought must be in furtherance of a “legitimate law enforcement inquiry.” § 3409(a)(2). Additionally there must be reason to believe that notice would (1) endanger
personal safety, (2) result in flight from prosecution, (3) result in evidence destruction or tampering, (4) cause the intimidation of potential witnesses, or (5) jeopardize the investigation or delay
an official proceeding. § 3409(a)(2)(A)–(E).
247
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207–18. For an
overview of the Money Laundering Control Act see generally Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confidentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22
INT’L L. 69 (1988).
248
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (2006).
249
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
250
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii).
251
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
252
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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value greater than $10,000” 253 was punishable by up to ten years incarceration. 254 Yet since the 1978 Right to Financial Privacy Act, the right to financial
privacy has been substantially altered.
B.

Britain and Terrorist Financing

Current efforts to deprive terrorist organizations from obtaining financial resources had their roots, like other anti-terrorism provisions, with the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. As was the case with incursions into the criminal
law, civil forfeiture and asset freezing gradually expanded in complexity and
scope. The legal framework used by British authorities to starve the IRA of resources was expanded and applied to current efforts to combat Al-Qaeda financing as presented below.
1.

Defunding the IRA

British efforts to stop terrorist financing developed in conjunction with
the efforts to criminalize the actions of the IRA in Northern Ireland. The original 1973 Emergency Provisions Act authorized the seizure of property that is
suspected of having been or currently being used to commit a terrorist offense. 255 Upon conviction of membership in a proscribed organization, the Act
permitted forfeiture of “any money or other property which at the time of the
offense he had in his possession or under his control for the use or benefit of the
proscribed organization.” 256 These provisions were carried directly into the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. 257 Solicitation of financial support for a proscribed organization was also incorporated into the list of
criminal offenses relating to membership in a terrorist organization.258
By 1989, the list of statutory offenses related to terrorist financing had
greatly expanded. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act,
enacted in 1989, both broadened the scope of previous crimes relating to terrorist financing and added additional related offenses. In addition to solicitation of
money for the commission of a terrorist offense, it was deemed a crime to have
“enter[ed] into or [be] otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby money
253

18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1986). The Money Laundering Control Act defines “monetary transaction” as “the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument.” § 1957(f)(1). It is to be noted that the Money Laundering Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4354 (1988), further
amended the Bank Secrecy Act by increasing the scope of the definition of what constitutes a
“financial institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 5326(3)(b) (2006).
254
§ 1957(b)(1).
255
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 11(3) (Eng.).
256
§ 19(2).
257
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, § 1(7) (Eng.).
258
§ 1(1)(b).
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or other property is or is to be made available to another person” or the benefit
of such an organisation.” 259 The mens rea requirement was, moreover, reduced.
Where the 1974 Act required that a person “knowingly” provide financial support to a terrorist organization, the 1989 Act required a lesser showing that the
individual have a “reasonable cause to suspect” the finances be used in the
commission of, or in connection with a terrorist offense or organization.260 The
1989 Act also made it a crime to assist in the retention of terrorist funds.261 The
Act provides that “[a] person is guilty of an offence if he enters into or is otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby the retention or control by or on
behalf of another person of terrorist funds is facilitated, whether by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise.”262
The seizure authority of police services was also expanded in the 1989
Act. In addition to the traditional requirements that the funds or property be
under the possession or control of the suspected individual, only a requirement
of having “reasonable cause to suspect” the funds would be directed toward a
proscribed organization or toward the commission of a terrorism offense was
sufficient to secure a conviction. 263 Indeed, the reasonable suspicion standard is
operationally equivalent to the willful blindness test found in American criminal
jurisprudence. The 1989 Act also established a framework for “forfeiture orders,” court-ordered property seizures in connection with a crime relating to the
financing of terrorism or a related offense.264 Two years later, crimes relating to

259

Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, §§ 9(2)(b), 10(1)(c) (Eng.)
(repealed).
260
§§ 9–10.
261
§ 11.
262
§ 11(1).
263
§ 13(2)(b).
264
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, at sch. 4. Schedule 4 authorizes
a court to make an order:
(a) requiring any money or other property to which the forfeiture order applies to be paid or handed over to the proper officer or to a constable designated for the purpose by the chief officer of police of a police force specified in
the order;
(b) directing any such property other than money or land to be sold or otherwise disposed of in such manner as the court may direct and the proceeds to
be paid to the proper officer;
(c) appointing a receiver to take possession, subject to such conditions and
exceptions as may be specified by the court, of any such property which is
land, to realise it in such manner as the court may direct and to pay the
proceeds to the proper officer;
(d) directing a specified part of any money, or of the proceeds of the sale,
disposal or realisation of any property, to which the forfeiture order applies to
be paid by the proper officer to or for a specified person falling within section
13(6) of this Act;
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financing terrorism were deemed to be “Scheduled Offenses” and thereby coming under the jurisdiction of the juryless Diplock Courts. 265 Additionally, the
asset seizure process and criminal penalties were expounded upon. 266
2.

Implementing Resolution 1373

The British legislative response to the September 11 attacks did not begin anew, or in a vacuum, particularly relating to anti-terrorist financing measures. The initial British legislative response—the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act of 2001 (“ATCSA”) 267—germinated directly from the Prevention
of Terrorism and Emergency Provisions Acts designed to combat political violence in Northern Ireland. The ATCSA contained two primary tools relating to
combating terrorist financing: civil in rem forfeiture and freezing orders.
The ATCSA authorizes the civil forfeiture of terrorist cash that is either
“intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism,” is the property of a terrorist
organization, or is obtained through the use of terrorism. 268 A collateral criminal
prosecution for a related terrorist offense is not a prerequisite to executing civil
forfeiture of terrorist finances.269 The Commissioner of Customs and Excise
may make an application of forfeiture in magistrate court.270 Financial assets
may be initially detained for forty-eight hours upon a reasonable suspicion that
the funds are related to terrorism. 271 A magistrate court may order the detention
of such assets for not more than two years. 272
Freezing orders, by contrast, are an extra-judicial means of disrupting
terrorist finance networks. 273 The British Treasury may issue a freezing order if
(e) making such other provision as appears to the court to be necessary for
giving effect to the forfeiture order or to any order made by virtue of paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) above.
Sch. 4, § 1(1)(a)–(e).
265
See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, sch. 1, § 20(b) (repealed).
For a discussion of Diplock Courts, see supra Part II.A.3.
266
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, at sch. 4.
267
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.). Preceding the Anti-Terrorism,
Crime and Security Act was the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, No. 3365
(Eng.). The United Nations Measures 2001 prohibited an individual from making funds available
to those engaged in the commission or execution of terrorist-related offenses. Id. § 3. The Order
also authorized the freezing of funds by the British Treasury. Id. § 4.
268
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 1(1)(a)–(c).
269
§ 1(2). It is to be noted that terrorist financing also falls under the purview of the Proceeds
of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29 (Eng.).
270
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, sch. 1, § 6(1)(a).
271
Sch. 1, § 3(1).
272
Sch. 1, § 3(2)(b).
273
“Freezing orders” are defined in the ATCSA as “an order which prohibits persons from
making funds available to or for the benefit of a person or persons specified in the order.” AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 5(1).
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it has a reasonable belief that an individual or organization is undertaking an
action “to the detriment of the United Kingdom’s economy (or part of it)” or an
action that constitutes a “threat to the life or property of one or more nationals of
the United Kingdom.” 274 Freezing orders must be submitted to Parliament,
which has the power to extend the operational period of the freezing order
beyond its original authorization.275
The ATCSA also contained several important provisions regarding the
disclosure of financial information.276 A freezing order may require the disclosure of financial information to the Treasury if three criteria are met. First, the
freezing order must contain a description of the person required to disclose the
information. 277 Second, the person required to make a disclosure “knows or suspects, or has grounds for knowing or suspecting” that the person identified in
the freezing order is a person whose funds are not to be made available. 278 The
person whose information is being disclosed is or has been a customer of or has
had “dealings” with the discloser since the freezing order came into effect. 279
The third and last condition is that the information came into the possession of
the discloser during the course of business. 280 Because the disclosure is made by
a private individual or entity, or may otherwise fall within its national security
exception, it is unclear whether a certificate pursuant to the Data Protection Act,
1998 is required prior to the disclosure.
Resolution 1373 was given further effect by the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Orders 2006 and 2009. 281 Both acts authorize the freezing of
funds of “designated” individuals. An individual can be “designated” either by a
decision of the European Council or by the Treasury. 282 Under the 2006 Order,
the Treasury can “designate” a person if it has “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that the individual is attempting, facilitating, participating in, or has committed an act of terrorism. 283 This again echoes of the willful blindness standard
in American jurisprudence. Alternatively, the Treasury can “designate” an individual if it reasonably suspects that the person is “owned or controlled, directly
274

§§ 4(1), 4(2)(a)–(b).
§ 10(2)(a)–(b).
276
§§ 17–20.
277
Sch. 3, § 6(2).
278
Sch. 3, § 6(3).
279
Sch. 3, § 6(3)(a)–(b).
280
Sch. 3, § 6(4).
281
The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2009, No. 1747 (Eng.); The Terrorism
(United Nations Measures) Order, 2006, No. 2657 (Eng.).
282
The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2006, § 3(1); The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2009, § 3(1). See also Council Decision 379, Implementing Article 2(3) of
Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities with a View to Combating Terrorism and Repealing Decision 2005/930/EC,
2006 O.J. (L 144) (EC).
283
The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2006, § 4(2)(a).
275
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or indirectly, by a designated person” or acted on behalf of a “designated” person. 284 The 2009 Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order added two significant caveats. First, the seized funds must be deemed to be of “a significant financial benefit” for the designated individual. 285 The 2009 Act also required that
Treasury designations are “necessary for purposes connected with protecting
members of the public from a risk of terrorism.” 286
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, however, invalidated the
designation previsions of the 2006 Act. 287 Four British citizens residing in East
London were informed that they were designated pursuant to article 4 of the
Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order of 2006, on the basis that an AlQueda operative identified them as terrorist facilitators, none of whom had been
charged with a terrorist-related offense. 288 The Supreme Court held that the
modifying language “reasonable grounds for suspecting” was ultra vires in light
of the requirements that domestic implementation of a Security Council determination, not involving the use of military force, be necessary and expedient. 289
The U.K. Supreme Court stated that the necessity and expedient requirements
allow the United Kingdom to meet its United Nations obligations. Yet
“[c]onferring an unlimited discretion on the executive as to how those resolutions, which it has a hand in making, are to be implemented seems to me to be
wholly unacceptable. It conflicts with the basic rules that lie at the heart of our
democracy.” 290

284

§ 4(2)(c)–(d).
The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2009, §§ 12(4)(a), 13(3)(a), 14(4)(a).
286
§ 4(1)(b).
287
Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, [2010] 2 UKSC (appeal taken from
EWCA Civ 1187) (U.K.). The U.K. Supreme Court noted that although the legality of the 2009
Act was not an issue presented, “the arguments that have been directed to the 2006 Order (“the
TO”) can be taken to apply to it [the 2009 Act] also.” Id. ¶ 28.
288
Id. ¶ 32.
289
Id. ¶¶ 58, 83. See also United Nations Act, 1946, c. 45 (Eng.). The relevant provision reads:
If, under article forty-one of the Charter of the United Nations signed at San
Francisco on the twenty-sixth day of June, nineteen hundred and forty-five,
(being the article which relates to measures not involving the use of armed
force) the Security Council of the United Nations call upon His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom to apply any measures to give effect to
any decision of that Council, His Majesty may by Order in Council make such
provision as appears to Him necessary or expedient for enabling those measures to be effectively applied, including (without prejudice to the generality of
the preceding words) provision for the apprehension, trial and punishment of
persons offending against the Order.
§ 1(1) (emphasis added).
290
Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, [2010] 2 UKSC (appeal taken from
EWCA Civ 1187) (UK) ¶ 45.
285
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C.

The PATRIOT Act

The American response to Resolution 1373 was the PATRIOT Act.
The PATRIOT Act is, to say the least, comprehensive legislation. It covers sixteen broad subjects in 161 sections. 291 Like the British legislative responses to
terrorism, the PATRIOT Act was passed quickly and without substantial congressional debate or amendment. 292 On October 4, 2001, the PATRIOT Act was
introduced in the Senate.293 Five days later, Senator Harry Reid “announced that
the bill would be held at the desk rather than being referred to committee for”
revision. 294 Then-Majority Leader Tom Daschle subsequently asked for unanimous consent that the Senate take up the legislation in order to limit possible
amendments. 295 The three amendments offered by Senator Russell Feingold
designed to curb some of the power of federal officials operating under the Act
were all tabled,296 and the Senate voted 96-1 to adopt the PATRIOT Act on October 11, 2001. 297
1.

Title III: Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering

Title III of the PATRIOT Act applies to financial crimes including terrorist financing, organized crime proceeds, and money laundering. Title III is
effectively a comprehensive amendment to the Bank Secrecy, Right to Financial
Privacy, and Money Laundering Control Acts. Indeed, it boasts its own special
designation as the International Money Laundering Abatement and AntiTerrorist Financing Act of 2001. 298
The definition of what constitutes a financial institution for purposes of
Title III is construed in the broadest possible terms. Private banks, casinos, and
even the United States Postal Service are all considered financial institutions
among twenty-three other entities outlined in Title III. 299 Title III is divided into
291

STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RETHINKING THE PATRIOT ACT: KEEPING AMERICAN SAFE AND
FREE 3 (2005).
292
Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1145, 1146 (2004).
293
Id. at 1167.
294
Howell, supra note 292, at 1167. This procedure is used to expedite the passage of legislation and limit amendments in deference to the executive. Id. The previous day, October 8, 2001,
Attorney General Ashcroft announced the arrest of 614 individuals and the continued search for
229 additional individuals. Id. This expedited legislative procedure was utilized for anti-terrorism
legislation following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Id. at n.147. See also 147 CONG. REC. S19,004 (Oct. 9, 2001).
295
147 CONG. REC. S10,363 (Oct. 9, 2001); Howell, supra note 292, at 1167–68.
296
Howell, supra note 292, at 1170–72.
297
Id. at 1172.
298
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 333 (2001).
299
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(Z) (2006). For purposes of the PATRIOT Act, a “financial
institution” includes insured banks, commercial banks, trust companies, private bankers, branches
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three subtitles. The first, Subtitle A, imposes criminal liability for multiple offenses relating to money laundering. 300 It introduces the concept of “special
measures” which can be imposed on financial institutions by the Secretary of
the Treasury. 301 Special measures may be invoked when, inter alia, there is evidence of terrorist financing or organized crime. Considered are the extent of
financial secrecy in a jurisdiction, the relationship between the size of the transaction and that of the jurisdiction, and the experience of U.S. officials in obtaining information in that jurisdiction.302 If the Secretary of the Treasury determines that an account is of “primary money laundering concern,” special measures may require financial institutions to keep comprehensive records concerning aggregate transaction amounts, and information on each transaction involving foreign jurisdictions. 303 The information obtained may be retained until the
identities of the owner and recipient of the funds, as well as their legal capacities, are identified.304
Subtitle B of Title III is a sweeping amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
of 1970. It eliminates customer notification requirements when banks disclose
their records. Recall, the Bank Secrecy Act provided that financial institutions
were required to keep records regarding financial transactions in excess of
$10,000, and institute internal compliance procedures.305 This was then supplemented by the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, which required
the filing of a Suspicious Activities Report (“SAR”) for suspect transactions. 306
Notwithstanding the reporting requirements, bank customers were entitled under

of foreign banks, credit unions, a thrift institutions, securities brokers, commodities brokers, investment bankers, investment companies, currency exchanges, issuers/redeemer/cashiers of travelers’ checks and money orders, credit card system operators, insurance companies, jewelers,
pawn shops, loan companies, travel agencies, conventional and unconventional money senders, a
licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission,
telegraph companies, automobile/airplane/boat salesmen, real estate brokers, the United States
Postal Service, and casinos. Furthermore, a “financial institution” is defined for purposes of the
Act as “any business . . . which the Secretary of the Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an
activity which is similar to, related to, or a substitute for any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is authorized to engage” or “any other business designated by the Secretary whose cash transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.” Id.
300
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18,
21, and 31 U.S.C.).
301
31 U.S.C. § 5318A(a)(1) (2006).
302
§ 5318A(c)(2)(A)(i)–(vii); see also § 5318A(c)(2)(B) (outlining the institutional factors the
Secretary of the Treasury may consider when implementing special measures).
303
§ 5318A(b)(1)(A).
304
§ 5318A(b)(1)(B).
305
31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1) (2011).
306
Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992)
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 18, 31 and 42 U.S.C.).
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the Bank Secrecy Act, as amended, to give notice prior to the disclosure of
records to law enforcement authorities.307
Another provision of significance to the confidentiality of financial
records is section 505. 308 Found in Title V, section 505 amends the Right to
Financial Privacy Act. 309 The PATRIOT Act widened the scope of FBI investigatory powers relating to financial records. Rather than being required to obtain
a warrant, an FBI Special Agent in Charge at a field office may submit a National Security Letter and obtain confidential financial records from any financial institution. 310 The only requirement is that the request must be made in the
furtherance of “clandestine intelligence activities” or the prevention of “international terrorism.” 311
The PATRIOT Act significantly erodes traditional notions of privacy
afforded to bank customers and the autonomy by which financial institutions
can conduct business. Reporting financial transactions above the $10,000 threshold now go to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), which
the Act made a bureau of the Treasury department. 312 FinCEN has become a de
facto clearinghouse of information from financial institutions.313 Notification to
the individual engaged in a transaction which has been reported by the bank or
financial institution is now prohibited. Neither the bank nor law enforcement
agencies investigating a suspect transaction may provide any suspect notice that
they are either under investigation,314 or are indemnified against civil or criminal liability for not providing notice to customers. 315 Thus, the PATRIOT Act
gives government authorities a significant tool to obtain private financial data in
the name of national security. 316 Taken as a whole, Title III creates a broad special needs exception to financial privacy. An account holder’s previously established expectation of privacy with regard to his or her financial data is reduced
in light of the need to target terrorist financing.

307

See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401(4), 3402(1) (2006).
See 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2006).
309
§§ 3401–3422.
310
§ 3414(a)(5)(A).
311
Id.
312
31 U.S.C. §§ 310, 5331 (2006).
313
C. WILLIAM MICHAELS, NO GREATER THREAT: AMERICA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE RISE
OF A NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 85 (2002).
314
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(i)–(ii) (2006). See Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d
678 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that a defendant was precluded under the PATRIOT Act from
obtaining records of Suspicious Activities Report filed by his or her financial institution).
315
§ 5318(g)(3).
316
Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the “Adverse
Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757, 768–69 (2006) (noting
that “data mining” financial records constitutes a counter-terrorism policy).
308
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Extraterritorial Effects on Banks

The rationale of Title III is rooted in strong, and indeed correct, belief
that foreign banks play a key role in illicit financial transactions.317 Congress
found that “outmoded and inadequate statutory provisions that make investigations, prosecutions, and forfeitures more difficult, particularly in cases in which
money laundering involves foreign persons, foreign banks, or foreign countries,” should be amended to facilitate investigations and successful prosecutions. 318 Congress further noted that “the ability to mount effective countermeasures to international money launderers requires national, as well as bilateral
and multilateral action, using tools specifically designed for that effort.”319 With
those aims in mind, Title III’s enactment significantly expanded the transnational authority of domestic law enforcement agencies by codifying United States
forfeiture law. 320 It set guidelines for prosecuting international financial crimes
and terrorist financing. 321 Title III also heightened the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of financial institutions.
Congress added a new provision to the federal civil forfeiture statute. 322
The new provision, section 981(k), outlines special rules for forfeitures from
interbank accounts held by foreign banks at banks in the United States. 323 This
section states:

317

See PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302(a)(4)–(5), 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006). The
provision stated:
[C]ertain jurisdictions outside of the United States that offer “offshore” banking and related facilities designed to provide anonymity, coupled with weak
financial supervisory and enforcement regimes, provide essential tools to disguise ownership and movement of criminal funds, derived from, or used to
commit, offenses ranging from narcotics trafficking, terrorism, arms smuggling, and trafficking in human beings, to financial frauds that prey on lawabiding citizens; transactions involving such offshore jurisdictions make it
difficult for law enforcement officials and regulators to follow the trail of
money earned by criminals, organized international criminal enterprises, and
global terrorist organizations.
Id.
318
§ 302(a)(8).
319
§ 302(a)(9).
320
See 1 OTTO G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND
REGULATORY OFFENSES 6A.01, at 6A-4 (2002).
321
18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B) (2006) (outlining foreign crimes that can be used as predicates
for a money laundering offence, public corruption, and all crimes of violence). Thus, the laundering of the proceeds of any offence and the transfer of any funds into or out of the United States
with the intent of promote any such offense is a violation of the law. Id.
322
18 U.S.C. § 981(k) (2006).
323
§ 981(k)(4)(A). An “interbank account” is defined as “an account held by one financial
institution at another financial institution primarily for the purpose of facilitating customer transactions.” 18 U.S.C. § 984(c)(2)(B) (2006).
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For the purpose of a forfeiture under this section . . . if funds are
deposited into an account at a foreign financial institution, and
that foreign financial institution . . . has an interbank account in
the United States with a covered financial institution . . . the
funds shall be deemed to have been deposited into the interbank
account in the United States, and any restraining order, seizure
warrant, or arrest warrant in rem regarding the funds may be
served on the covered financial institution, and funds in the interbank account, up to the value of the funds deposited into the
account at the foreign financial institution . . . may be restrained, seized, or arrested. 324
Interbank accounts—also known as correspondent accounts—are utilized by
foreign banks to facilitate transactions in jurisdictions where the banks do not
have physical presence. Liquidity, the internationalization of financial transactions, and the need of foreign banks to have access to American currency have
all necessitated the use of interbank accounts.325 Indeed, Congress specifically
noted the susceptibility of interbank accounts to be utilized in illicit financial
transactions. 326
It was relatively difficult for a federal agency to acquire the in rem forfeiture of laundered funds in interbank accounts of foreign banks prior to the
enactment of section 981(k). 327 Under the pre-amended forfeiture statute, a foreign bank was deemed to be the owner of interbank funds rather than individual
depositors. 328 Unless the bank “knowingly engaged” in money laundering, it
was entitled to assert an innocent owner defense to a forfeiture action.329 In
nearly all cases, a bank’s conduct would not meet a threshold of knowingly engaged in criminal wrongdoing, thus most forfeiture actions would fail. 330
Section 981(k) expanded the government’s civil forfeiture power in two
significant ways. First, the section deems funds deposited at a foreign bank that
324

§ 981(k)(1)(A) (internal citations omitted).
See MINORITY STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 107TH CONG., REPORT
ON CORRESPONDENT BANKING: A GATEWAY FOR MONEY LAUNDERING 11–14 (Comm. Print 2001)
[hereinafter LEVIN REPORT].
326
See PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302(a)(6), 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006) (noting that
“correspondent banking facilities are one of the banking mechanisms susceptible in some circumstance to manipulation by foreign banks to permit the laundering of funds by hiding the identify of
real parties in interest to financial transactions”).
327
See LEVIN REPORT, supra note 325, at 41–42.
328
See United States v. Union Bank for Sav. & Inv. (Jordan), 487 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2007)
(discussing the pre-PATRIOT Act asset forfeiture statute).
329
See 18 U.S.C. § 984(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. 5 1999) (stating that “[n]o action . . . to forfeit
property not traceable directly to the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture may be taken
against funds held by a financial institution in an interbank account, unless the financial institution
holding the account knowingly engaged in the offense”).
330
See Jordan, 487 F.3d at 15.
325
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has an interbank account in the United States as deposited into an interbank account in the United States. 331 Thus, any restraining order, seizure warrant, or
arrest in rem against funds in a foreign bank may be served on a United States
bank holding the interbank account. 332 The deposit of forfeitable funds at a foreign bank triggers the forfeiture of an equivalent amount from an interbank account. 333 Fluctuations in the amount held by the depositor at the foreign bank, as
a result of periodic withdrawals and additional deposits from other licit sources,
will not affect the forfeitability of funds.334 There is no requirement that any
funds in an interbank account be traced to forfeitable funds deposited at the foreign bank. 335
A second important change is how the owner of interbank funds may
contest their forfeiture. 336 Under the new statute, the foreign depositor, rather
than the foreign bank, is considered to be the owner of the funds. 337 Only when
the wrongdoing can be attributed to the foreign financial institution,338 or when
the foreign financial institution can prove by a preponderance of evidence that it
“discharged all or part of its obligation to the prior owner” will the financial
institution be deemed the owner of the funds.339
Additionally, the revised statutory language reverses the burden of
proof of the innocent owner defense. Under the previous statutory language, the
government could not take action “against funds held by a financial institution
in an interbank account, unless the financial institution holding the account
knowingly engaged in the offense.” 340 Yet under the amended language, the
claimant of the seized funds has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he or she was an innocent owner. 341 The statute also imposes an
affirmative obligation on the individual owner of the forfeited funds to prevent
the use of those funds for illegal purposes “upon learning of the conduct giving
rise to the forfeiture.” 342 The revised statutory language in effect codifies
Campbell v. Unites States and much of the willful blindness case law established over the course of the preceding years. 343
331

18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(1)(A) (2006).
Id.
333
§ 981(k)(2).
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
See § 981(k)(3) (authorizing actions to contest the forfeiture of funds). See also 18 U.S.C. §
983 (2006) (outlining the procedures by which a contestation of forfeited funds may proceed).
337
§§ 981(k)(4)(B)(i)(I)–(II).
338
§ 981(k)(4)(B)(ii)(I).
339
§ 981(k)(4)(B)(ii)(II).
340
18 U.S.C. § 984(d)(1) (1994).
341
18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2006).
342
§ 983(d)(2)(A)(ii).
343
See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
332
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3.

The Case of Union Bank

A recent decision by the First Circuit illustrates how section 981(k) operates in practice and affects both depositors and financial institutions. The case
arose out of a Canadian telemarketing scheme, whereby individuals were informed that they were eligible to collect proceeds of Canadian lottery winnings.
In order to collect the winnings, they were to pay processing expenses by sending cashier’s checks, drawn on U.S.-based accounts, to post office boxes in
Montreal. 344 After exchanging hands several times, those checks eventually
made their way to a money exchange business in East Jerusalem. 345 The proprietors of the money exchange, Mohammed, Samir, and Talal Esseilheh, deposited
the finds in their accounts at a Ramallah, West Bank branch office of Jordanbased Union Bank for Savings and Investment (“Union Bank”). 346 Union Bank
transferred the U.S.-based cashier’s checks to its interbank account held at the
Bank of New York (“BoNY”) to facilitate payment. 347 BoNY gave Union Bank
a provisional credit on its interbank account for the sum of the checks.348 None
of the seized funds were ever transferred at any time to an account in the United
States. 349
The United Sates seized approximately $2.8 million from the interbank
account as proceeds from the telemarketing scheme. 350 Union Bank filed an in
rem claim in United States District Court for the amount of the seized funds,
arguing, inter alia, that it was an innocent owner of the funds in its interbank
account at BoNY. 351 The government prevailed on its motion for summary
judgment, arguing that Union Bank was not the owner of the funds, and that as a
result, the bank lacked any right arising under section 981(k) to recover any of
the funds. 352 Both parties appealed.
The First Circuit in Union Bank (Jordan) v. United States upheld the
district court’s holding that the Esseilheh brothers were the owners of the deposited funds, notwithstanding the money exchange did not have its own business
344

Jordan, 487 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2007).
Id.
346
Id. at 11–12. The first Union Bank account was in the name of Samir Esseilheh. Under the
terms of a written agreement with Union Bank, Mohammed Esseilheh also had deposit and withdrawal authority. This account was closed prior to the seizures, and the balance transferred to a
second account. The second account was in the name of Mohammed Esseilheh. Union Bank permitted the deposit of U.S. dollar-denominated instruments in the account. Samir Esseilheh and
Talal Esseilheh served as guarantors on the account and thus they were, along with Mohammed
Esseilheh, liable for the account. Id.
347
Id. at 12.
348
Id.
349
Id. at 12–13.
350
Id. at 10.
351
Id. at 10, 13.
352
Id. at 13.
345
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account. 353 The brothers, as joint venturers, were the owners of the funds at the
time of deposit, and the accounts were used in the normal course of business.
Union Bank had grounded its defense on the assertion that it had discharged all its obligations to the brothers at the time of the seizure. It could accordingly claim standing as an owner of the funds under the exception contained
in section 981. 354 Moreover, it argued that its obligation to depositors should be
linked to its ability to obtain recourse for the seizure of funds from the depositor. Under Union Bank’s depository relationship with the Esseilheh brothers and
under applicable foreign law, it had no recourse to recover for the loss the bank
would suffer through the seizure. 355 The First Circuit rejected this argument as
the bank’s obligations to the brothers were measured by their account balances.
On the seizure date, the bank’s obligations to the brothers exceeded the amount
of the forfeitable cashier’s checks, and thus it had not fulfilled the entirety of its
obligations. 356 The court also rejected the bank’s public policy arguments that
its inability to collect from the foreign depositor would circumvent the expressed purpose of Congress in crafting the ownership provisions. 357 The depositor, it was argued, would have no losses and thus no incentive to appear in a
forfeiture proceeding. 358 The court, however, noted that there was no evidence
in the record why foreign banks could not protect themselves from seizure by
contract or other agreement. 359
According to the First Circuit, the legislative history of the provision
suggested that Congress intended to treat foreign and domestic deposits, not
foreign and domestic banks, similarly. 360 Thus, section 981(k) was intended to
reach through the bank, as an intermediary, to particular depositors rather than
specific accounts.361 Thus, any pre-PATRIOT Act statutory construction mandating that forfeiture of illicit funds had to be directed at those contained in a
specific account were inapplicable in light of the PATRIOT Act’s amendments
to the civil forfeiture statute.
Foreign banks thus face a dilemma. Title III of the PATRIOT Act grants
comprehensive powers to the United States government to prescribe special
measures against any foreign financial institution without jurisdictional consid353

Id. at 17–18.
Id. at 18. See 18 U.S.C § 981(k)(4)(B)(ii)(II) (2006) (“The foreign financial institution . . .
may be considered the ‘owner’ of the funds only if—[it] establishes, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that prior to the restraint, seizure, or arrest of the funds, the foreign financial institution .
. . had discharged all or part of its obligation to the prior owner of the funds.”).
355
Jordan, 487 F.3d at 18.
356
Id.
357
Id. at 19.
358
Id.
359
Id. at 19–20.
360
Id. at 21.
361
Id. at 21–22.
354
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erations. 362 Union Bank could not seek recourse from the brothers based upon
the customer agreements and guarantees, as they provided that the brothers
would be liable when a deposited check is “proved to be invalid, counterfeited
or unacceptable for cashing due to any reason whatsoever.”363 However, the
BoNY presented the checks to the issuing banks for payment, none of which
sought to reverse payment. 364 All applicable statutory and regulatory time periods for a reversal had expired allowing for the credit on the foreign bank’s
interbank account to become final. Therefore, the brothers were entitled to the
funds as neither the customer service agreements nor the applicable banking
laws provided any basis for Union Bank to recover based on the seizures.365
The Union Bank had to pay for its customer’s participation in money
laundering and criminal offenses with little or no chance of recovery. Banks
must decide whether the difficulty of recovering for any U.S.-based seizure
from their customers requires them to implement additional contractual or security measures. When United States agencies investigate a suspect transaction the
agency may provide notice that the financial institution is either under investigation, 366 or can be indemnified against civil or criminal liability for not providing
notice to customers.367 The risk of seizure in the United States may thus necessitate that foreign banks initiate anti-money laundering programs which exceed
what they would be required to do under the laws of their home country. Although this is desirable, conflicts may develop when the bank has varying, mandated duties under its domestic banking laws and those of the United States.
Section 981(k) does permit consideration of whether a forfeiture proceeding
should be terminated due to a conflict of law between the United States and the
foreign bank’s home jurisdiction. 368 However, this provision will only apply if it
is in the interest of justice to do so and provided that national interests of the
United States are not harmed. 369
4.

Inter-Agency Information Sharing

One aspect of the causal analysis following the September 11 attacks
that became prominent in the national security reform discourse was the lack of
information sharing between federal agencies. 370 Members of Congress would
362

Id. at 20.
Id. at 12–13.
364
Id. at 12.
365
Id. at 12–13.
366
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(B)(2)(i)–(ii) (2006). See Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp.
2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 2004).
367
§ 5318(g)(B)(3). See also Ramasastry, supra note 316, at 768–69.
368
18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(1)(B) (2006).
369
Id.
370
See, e.g., SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE IMPERATIVE OF REFORM IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY (ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY) at 5 (December 10, 2002)
363

File: Baldwin and Koslosky

Created on: 12/2/2011 3:34:00 PM

716

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 12/6/2011 12:15:00 PM

[Vol. 114

come to see increased information sharing as a key reform component in light of
the Central Intelligence Agency not sharing information regarding the possible
use of aircraft as weapons, or its suspicions of the individuals who would later
pilot a plane into the Pentagon. The legislative response to these concerns—
notably PATRIOT Act section 218—would fly in the face of decades of jurisprudence and constitutional safeguards.
a.

Conventional Distinctions Between Foreign Intelligence and Criminal Investigations

Traditionally, there has been a wall between criminal investigations and
national security intelligence gathering. In United States v. United States District Court (“Keith”), 371 the Supreme Court considered the executive’s power to
conduct warrantless surveillance pursuant to the interests of national security. 372
The defendants in Keith were being prosecuted in the Eastern District of Michigan for planting a bomb at a Central Intelligence Agency field office.373 During
the course of the investigation, federal authorities used electronic surveillance to
monitor conversations of the defendants. The district court convened a preliminary hearing to ascertain whether the intelligence information gathered had
“tainted” the evidence contained in the indictment which was to be introduced at
trial. 374 Judge Damon J. Keith held that the surveillance evidence was obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 375
The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment required the government to obtain a warrant during the course of a domestic national security
investigation. 376 In finding no Fourth Amendment exception applicable to domestic security threats, the Court balanced the risk of “unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression” against the government’s duty
to keep the United States safe. 377 Specifically, the Supreme Court looked to
whether the surveillance was “deemed necessary” to a national security investigation. 378 The surveillance was required to be “directed primarily to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with respect to subversive forces, and [was]

(stating that the September 11 attacks “should be an object lesson in the perils of failing to share
information promptly and efficiently between (and within) organizations”).
371
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
372
Id. at 299.
373
Id.
374
Id. at 300.
375
Id. at 301.
376
Id. at 321.
377
Id. at 314–15.
378
Id. at 308–09.
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not an attempt to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions.”379 The
“primary purpose” test was also incorporated directly into the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), the statutory framework governing the procedures by which electronic surveillance and physical searches are conducted. 380
In United States v. Falvey, 381 the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York was confronted with the admissibility of electronic surveillance
evidence obtained pursuant to FISA at trial. 382 The government sought to introduce telephone conversations of the defendants—all United States citizens—
who were suspected of smuggling weapons to the IRA. 383 The defendants were
provided notice and the transcripts of all the wiretaps as well as documentation
of “minimization logs” kept by law enforcement pursuant to FISA and constitutional requirements. 384
The district court held that the electronic evidence gathered pursuant to
FISA was admissible in criminal proceedings. 385 The court found the primary
purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence, and as such did
run afoul of the Keith requirements. 386 The court also noted that the government
did not have a carte blanche for obtaining information after the primary purpose
test had been satisfied. The resulting search and seizure forting intelligence surveillance was still required to be “reasonable” for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. 387
b.

Blurring Intelligence Gathering and Criminal Investigations

Section 203(a) of the PATRIOT Act changed Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e) to allow for the sharing of grand jury information. 388 Grand jury
379
Id. at 318–19. For background on Keith see Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Surveillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133,
145–48 (2004).
380
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, § 1804(a)(7)(B) Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811(1982)) provided that the “purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.” FISA further required “minimization”
procedures to curtail the collection, retention, and dissemination of information relating to American citizens. §§ 1801(h), 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(4).
381
540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
382
Id. at 1307–08.
383
Id. at 1308.
384
Id.
385
Id. at 1314.
386
Id. The district court noted that evidence obtained pursuant to FISA where the primary
purpose is a criminal investigation is inadmissible in court. See United States v. Truong Dinh
Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912–13, 916 (4th Cir. 1980).
387
Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1312.
388
PATRIOT Act Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
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secrecy has long been a fundamental legal tenet traceable to English jurisprudence. 389 Section 203(a) created an exception to Rule 6(e) by allowing grand
jury information to be disclosed to a government attorney in the course of criminal proceedings. 390 One instance in which disclosure of grand jury information
to an attorney of the United States is specifically authorized is financial
crimes. 391 In operation, section 203 permits unrestricted sharing of information
related to terrorism. 392 Essentially, a special needs exception mandating the disclosure of financial crimes information in criminal proceedings further erodes
traditional understandings of bank secrecy and the secrecy of grand jury investigations. Read in conjunction with the special measures permitted by Title III,
the reduction of grand jury secrecy relating to bank crimes demonstrates how
anti-terrorism legislation can permeate and infuse into other areas of law.393
The distinction between criminal and intelligence investigations was
further eroded by PATRIOT Act section 218. 394 The preexisting FISA standard
that “the purpose” of surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence was replaced
by a lower threshold of constitutionality requiring only that foreign intelligence
gathering be “a significant purpose” of surveillance. 395 The constitutionality of
the significant purpose standard was considered by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (“FISC”).
389

See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (holding that grand jury
secrecy is not to be violated except for reasons substantially necessary); Mark Kadish, Behind the
Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1, 13 (1996); Sara Levy, The PATRIOT Act Grand Jury Disclosure Exception: A Proposal
for Reconciling Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement Concerns, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L.
2 (2005).
390
See PATRIOT Act § 203(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3).
391
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3322(b)(1) (2006). The statute provides:
Upon motion of an attorney for the government, a court may direct disclosure
of matters occurring before a grand jury during an investigation of a banking
law violation to identified personnel of a Federal or State financial institution
regulatory agency—
(A) for use in relation to any matter within the jurisdiction of such regulatory
agency; or
(B) to assist an attorney for the government to whom matters have been disclosed . . . .
Id.
392
Kate Martin, Why Sections 203 and 905 Should be Modified, in PATRIOT DEBATES 6 (Stewart A. Baker & John Kavanagh eds., 2005).
393
Jennifer M. Collins, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury Information
With the Intelligence Community Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1286
(2002).
394
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006).
395
Id. (emphasis added); see generally William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down:
Secret Surveillance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1174–81 (2003) (discussing the
erosion of the foreign intelligence and criminal investigation dichotomy).
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The FISC exercises jurisdiction over “applications for and grant orders
approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States.” 396 Subsequent to the passage of the PATRIOT Act the Department of Justice moved to
vacate the intelligence sharing procedures dealing with minimization and intelligence sharing as required by FISA. 397 Originally promulgated by the Attorney
General in 1995, these procedures construct a legal “wall”398 separating intelligence gathering and criminal investigations by curtailing the collection and dissemination of intelligence information gathered about American citizens.399
The government proposed to amend the guidelines by allowing criminal
prosecutors to advise and consult with intelligence officials in the course of investigations. 400 The FISC rejected the idea that law enforcement and intelligence
operations could be combined and denied the Justice Department’s request. It
held that the separation of criminal and intelligence investigations was eliminated by the proposed amendments, which gave “criminal prosecutors every legal
advantage . . . used by U.S. intelligence agencies.” 401 As such, the protection of
individual privacy was unfairly encumbered by the competing interest of collecting foreign intelligence.402
The opinion was, however, overruled on appeal by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (“FISCR”); the first time it convened in its
twenty-four year history. 403 The FISCR held in In re Sealed Cases 404 that the
FISA as intended by Congress “clearly did not preclude or limit the govern396

50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006). See also 50 U.S.C. § 1822(c) (2006) (granting FISC jurisdiction
over physical searches conducted pursuant to FISA).
397
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(4) (2006); In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct., 2002).
398
See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RETHINKING THE PATRIOT ACT: KEEPING AMERICA SAFE AND
FREE 37–38 (2005).
399
See United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
400
In re All Matters Submitted, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
401
Id. at 624. The FISC also added:
[T]he plain meaning of consultations and coordination now specifically authorized in the Act is based on the need to adjust or bring into alignment two different but complementary interests—intelligence gathering and law enforcement. In FISA cases this presupposes separate intelligence and criminal investigations, or a single investigation with intertwined interests, which need to be
brought into harmony to avoid dysfunction and frustration of either interest. If
criminal prosecutors direct both the intelligence and criminal investigations,
or a single investigation having combined interests, coordination becomes
subordination of both investigations or [sic] interests to law enforcement objectives.
Id. at 623–24.
402
Id. at 625.
403
Under the FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review has jurisdiction “to review the
denial of any application made under this chapter.” 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2006).
404
310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
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ment's use or proposed use of foreign intelligence information, which included
evidence of certain kinds of criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution.” 405 The
FISCR stated that it was “puzzling” that the Department of Justice read the
FISA as a limit on its ability to obtain foreign intelligence orders in cases it intended to prosecute.406
As such, the court found that separating intelligence and criminal law
was “a false dichotomy” rectified by section 218 of the PATRIOT Act. 407 The
FISCR rejected the approach by the FISC of balancing interests of privacy and
intelligence gathering. 408 The “significant purpose” standard was held as constitutionally valid since it still required the government to have a “measurable foreign intelligence purpose” consistent with the intent of the FISA. 409 The FISCR
stated that if the “sole objective” of the government in requesting a FISA warrant was criminal prosecution, it would be denied. 410 However, if a federal
agency “entertains a realistic option” in an investigation other than a criminal
prosecution or “articulates a broader objective than criminal prosecution,” then
the significant purpose standard is met. 411
Moreover, the minimization procedures established under the FISA
were construed so as to morph intelligence and criminal investigatory functions
together. According to the FISCR, the minimization procedures established under the FISA were not intended to limit the ability of a prosecutor to counsel
federal intelligence agencies regarding “the initiation, operation, continuation,
or expansion of FISA surveillances.” 412 As such, the FISCR has significantly
curtailed the legal mechanisms that previously separated intelligence and criminal functions of government and safeguarded individual liberty.
D.

Mission Creep: The U.S. and Abroad

Anti-terrorism legislation, both in the United States and abroad, has had
an uncanny ability to perpetuate and morph itself from its original intent notwithstanding the underlying threat. Both British anti-terrorist responses and the
American PATRIOT Act altered substantive and procedural law. In Northern
Ireland, due process rights once guaranteed to criminal defendants as bedrock
principles of the common law were subordinated to the more urgent concerns of
405

Id. at 727 (emphasis removed). The FISCR called into question the operating assumption of
the FISC that there was an inherent barrier under the FISA between intelligence activities and
ordinary law enforcement. Id. at 721.
406
Id. at 723.
407
Id. at 735; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006).
408
In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735.
409
Id.
410
Id.
411
Id.
412
Id. at 731 (emphasis added).
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national security. 413 Anti-terrorist legislation in the United Kingdom was
drafted, for instance, so as to target a specific group; only nationalist paramilitary organizations were proscribed in the Prevention of Terrorism Acts. 414
Yet, despite the metamorphic nature of legislation promulgated by the
British Government in Westminster, it was to an extent controlled by an external
judicial tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). The ECtHR
in Borgan v. United Kingdom 415 held that the detention of suspects in Northern
Ireland for between five and six days was incompatible with the European Convention of Human Rights. 416 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR also
invalidated official British policy sanctioning the maltreatment of suspected
terrorists. 417 Moreover, the court entertained complaints from deaths resulting
from British “shoot-to-kill” policies leading to settlement and compensation for
victims’ families. 418
However, even the presence of a supranational tribunal does not guarantee the preservation of basic human rights or civil liberties. Much of current
efforts targeting terrorist finances in the U.K. are embodied by civil forfeiture
statues and are beyond the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. 419 However, British courts
are becoming more adept at curtailing the usurpation of legislative power by the
executive, as the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom did in Her Majesty’s
Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed. 420 Yet unknown is the extent to which
civil forfeiture and other actions will be curtailed in light of the rights of ordinary criminal defendants.
United States legal institutions, by contrast, do not contemplate an
extraterritorial or international tribunal having the authority to invalidate antiterrorism polities whether originating under the PATRIOT Act, the FISA, or
otherwise. The only legal institution capable of serving as a check on terrorism
legislation is the federal judiciary. It is a fundamental canon of American jurisprudence that the judiciary ensure that acts of the executive and the legislature
413

See discussion supra Parts II.A.1. and II.A.3.
See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 1(1)(a)–(b) sch. 1 (Eng.) (providing that the
Irish Republican Army is the only organization to be proscribed and covered by penalties under
the act). It is to be noted that the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, Schedule 1 included only the
Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army, both republican paramilitary
organizations. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
415
11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (1989).
416
Id. at 62.
417
Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978) (invalidating wall-standing, hooding, continuous noise, deprivation
of food, and deprivation of sleep in interrogations).
418
See Farrell v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 466 (1983). For a discussion of British
“shoot-to-kill” polities with regard to suspected nationalist paramilitaries see EWING & GEARTY,
supra note 19, at 230–41.
419
IV EDWARD REES & RICHARD FISHER, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME
ACT 2002, at 2–3 (2005).
420
[2010] UKSC 2 (Eng.).
414
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comply with the Constitution. 421 A potentially dangerous situation arises when
the judiciary allows its own procedures to be altered by anti-terrorist legislation.
Like the case of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, American
anti-terrorist legislation is targeted at a specific entity. But this entity is not a
class of people like the republican communities of Belfast or Derry. 422 Rather,
this entity is a specific class of crime that is defined by its institutional and legal
nature. American anti-terrorist legislation is targeted largely at crimes offenses
financial transactions, banks, and other financial institutions; areas that the law
has traditionally afforded a degree of protection and confidentiality.
Much of the basis of American anti-terrorist legislation has its roots in
pre-2000 special needs exception and willful blindness jurisprudence. The
PATRIOT Act’s provisions come harmoniously together, not only providing for
virtually unlimited access to financial records under a legislatively-created special needs exception, but also for eliminating the wall between intelligence gathering and criminal investigations. The PATRIOT Act covers almost every
conceivable entity involved in financial transactions, from the biggest international bank to the local 7-Eleven. 423 The definition of what constitutes a financial institution is also so broad that the emergency legislation’s reach is omnipresent, affecting virtually every American from every walk of life.
Title III of the PATRIOT Act allows the Secretary of the Treasury to
invoke “special measures” requiring any financial institution to keep and make
available records involving designated accounts. 424 Customers of banks and
other financial institutions are no longer entitled to notification regarding the
filing of SARs due to Title III’s amendment of the Bank Secrecy Act. 425 Moreover, a particular exception in Title V of the PATRIOT Act specifically allows
federal law enforcement authorities to obtain financial information.426 The authority is granted to the Special Agent in Charge who is merely required to file a
National Security Letter.427 This provision effectively places the assessment of
421

See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
This is not to say that Arab-Americans have not been forced to bear hardships of antiterrorism legislation, ethnic profiling, and civil rights deprivations resulting from the moral panic
subsequent to the attacks on the World Trade Center, as well as the general Middle Eastern construction of terrorism. See generally GEARTY, supra note 10, at 113 (arguing that popular conceptualizations of terrorism have arisen from violence associated with the Middle East); Michael
Welsh, Trampling Human Rights in the War on Terror: Implications to the Sociology of Denial,
12 CRIT. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5–11 (2003) (discussing moral panic after the September 11 attacks).
423
See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(X) (2006).
424
31 U.S.C. §§ 5318A(a)(1), 5318A(c)(2)(A)(i)–(vii), 5318A(c)(2)(B) (2006).
425
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(i)–(ii) (2006) (prohibiting financial institutions from giving notice to
customers whose bank records were disclosed to investigative authorities); Whitney Nat’l Bank v.
Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that the PATRIOT Act precluded a defendant from obtaining records of Suspicious Activities Report filed by his or her financial institution).
426
See 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2006).
427
Id.
422
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the reasonableness of the investigation and its techniques in the hands of the
agents conducting the investigation themselves. The judicial check on executive
branch investigations is altogether eliminated, risking unconstrained encroachment by indefinite, unimpeded investigations into bank privacy and civil liberties.
Mission creep can also occur in the manner in which anti-terrorism legislation is implemented. The Department of Justice currently contracts many of
its functions arising under the PATRIOT Act’s authorization to outside contractors. Often these contractors employ newly graduated law students as “law
clerks.” Despite only requiring the lowest level, “confidential” security clearance, newly-graduated “legal” contractors work within the Department of Justice organization and carry out functions related to asset and data seizures. Indeed, should legal malfeasance occur, questions may arise as to whether an unbarred or newly barred law clerk was acting in the capacity as an attorney. Potential abuses of power may also be complicated by issues such as contractual
liability, indemnification, sovereign immunity, and so forth.
The erosion of the distinction between criminal investigations and intelligence gathering further magnifies the threat of mission creep regarding financial crimes. Sealed Case marked the effective coup de grace of the criminalintelligence dichotomy announced in Keith and utilized in subsequent investigations. 428 Authorities conducting clandestine intelligence investigations pursuant
to FISA are required only to demonstrate that a significant purpose of the investigation is the collection of foreign intelligence.429 The FISCR stated that this
standard effectively inextricably combines criminal and intelligence investigations by allowing ordinary law enforcement officials to assist and consult with
intelligence officers in the “initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion” of
FISA surveillance. 430
Defendants under federal criminal grand jury indictment are liable to
have information disclosed to other investigatory agencies pursuant to the
PATRIOT Act’s alteration of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 431 Grand
jury information can now be disclosed to any government attorney, and is not
limited to information regarding a threat or incident of terrorism. 432 Not only
does the information flow both ways—to and from both criminal and intelligence investigations—but it also flows prior to and during the course of criminal proceedings.
Thus, defendants are subject to an investigatory cul-de-sac by which an
endless assault of evidence obtained in successive rounds of intelligence and
428

See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
429
50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006).
430
In re Sealed Cases, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam).
431
PATRIOT Act Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
432
See Martin, supra note 392, at 6; Jennifer M. Collins, supra note 393, at 1286.
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criminal investigations are brought to bear without any meaningful judicial supervision. Once information is obtained by law enforcement pursuant to law
created for anti-terrorist intelligence investigations, it may be shared with the
intelligence community. Intelligence agencies then may utilize and disseminate
information without restriction as they see fit back to law enforcement, which
may then be able to open a new investigation into another alleged criminal activity with respect to the same or different defendant. Further, defendants are not
often given the chance to ascertain the veracity or challenge the admissibility of
evidence obtained pursuant to FISA and introduced into evidence in criminal
proceedings. 433
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Moral panic is a normal and logical consequence after a mass crime or
terrorist attack. A legislative response to a threat to public safety or national
security is often necessary to supplement existing criminal laws. However, such
a response can also damage the gentle balance between security and liberty.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government
enacted the most comprehensive changes and sweeping additions to the investigative authority of the United States government. In light of existing criminal
jurisprudence, the PATRIOT Act risks attacking the institutional safeguards
designed to protect individuals from the awesome investigatory powers of the
state. American jurisprudence has traditionally afforded legal insulation of substantive and procedural rights against encroachment from the intelligence community to ensure that investigations are reasonably limited to comport with notions of justice and fairness. However, this insulation has been eroded in the
name of necessity. Special needs exceptions and willful blindness jurisprudence
have both germinated into the judicial underpinnings of a comprehensive statutory framework that risks curtailing the constitutional liberties of the American
public.
Anti-terrorism legislation in both the United States and the United
Kingdom has penetrated into non-terrorist related offenses. Perhaps this is inevitable to the extent that laws are made and applied by imperfect individuals.
The combination of the increased ability of investigatory agencies to obtain financial data, and subsequently share it without impede puts the systemic integrity of financial and legal institutions at unique risk. Although some of these
measures are necessary in combating international terrorist networks, it is essential that legal institutions in the U.S. and abroad be vigilant in monitoring terrorist and non-terrorist related prosecutions, and prepared to constrain antiterrorism laws to that which they are intended, and guard against unwarranted
encroachment.
433

See United States v. Sattar, No. 02-CR.395(JGK), 2003 WL 22510435 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
2003) (unpublished case) (holding a defendant is not entitled to a pretrial discovery hearing regarding evidence obtained pursuant to the FISA).

